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offensive-osint

Category: Coding Risk: High risk ★ 4.7 · Rating 4.7/5 (1817) elementalsouls/Claude-OSINT NOASSERTION

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name: offensive-osint
description: "Operational arsenal for external red-team and bug-bounty reconnaissance. Concrete wordlists (28 Swagger paths, 13 GraphQL paths, 35 high-risk ports, 6 missing-header findings, 15 always-on HTTP checks, 5 SAML paths, cloud bucket permutations, JS guess-paths, vendor product fingerprints for Citrix/F5/Pulse/Fortinet/Cisco/PaloAlto/VMware/Exchange, cloud-native service fingerprints, container/K8s exposure paths, CI/CD platform paths, documentation/wiki leak paths, WHOIS/RDAP, DNS record catalog, Wayback CDX recipes), 43+-pattern secret-regex catalog (incl. modern AI API keys: Anthropic/OpenAI/HuggingFace/Cloudflare/DigitalOcean/npm/PyPI/Docker Hub/Atlassian/DataDog/Sentry/ngrok), 80+ dork corpus across 9 categories, GitHub code-search dorks, copy-paste curl/httpie probes for every check, post-discovery enumeration workflows (AWS/GitHub/Slack/JWT/PMAK/Anthropic/OpenAI), endpoint interest scoring rubric (0–100), mobile app ownership confidence, identity-fabric endpoints (Entra/Okta/ADFS/Google/SAML/M365 Teams+SharePoint+OneDrive+OAuth + user-enum), GraphQL field-suggestion enumeration when introspection disabled, 9 read-only secret validators (Postman/AWS/GitHub/Slack/Anthropic/OpenAI/npm/Atlassian/DataDog), Postman workspace search (verified endpoint), Stack Exchange sweep, public SaaS dorks, email security analysis (SPF/DMARC/DKIM/BIMI/MTA-STS/DNSSEC), origin-discovery / CDN bypass techniques, TLS deep audit (sslyze/testssl.sh/JA3/JA4), reverse-DNS sweep + IPv6 enum, vulnerability prioritization data sources (NVD/EPSS/CISA KEV/ExploitDB/Metasploit), 27 attack-path hint templates, 80+ severity-matrix examples, LinkedIn employee enumeration, job posting tech-stack analysis, Slack/Discord workspace discovery, package registry leak hunting (npm/PyPI/Docker Hub/Quay/GHCR), sat imagery for physical recon, tooling quick-install one-liners, sector-specific recon notes (healthcare/finance/ICS-SCADA/IoT/government), runnable stdlib-only secret_scan.py helper, plus the existing tool references for username/email/phone/people/social/breach/infrastructure/crypto/media/geospatial/AI/archiving/automation. Use when you need concrete probe paths, regexes, payloads, scoring rules, curl one-liners, and tool URLs for an authorized external recon engagement."
version: 2.1.1
triggers:

  • external recon
  • external red team
  • red team external
  • attack surface management
  • ASM
  • bug bounty recon
  • bug bounty
  • reconnaissance
  • footprinting
  • asset discovery
  • swagger discovery
  • openapi discovery
  • graphql introspection
  • graphql discovery
  • subdomain enumeration
  • subdomain takeover
  • cloud bucket enumeration
  • bucket enum
  • S3 enum
  • GCS enum
  • Azure blob enum
  • identity fabric
  • SSO discovery
  • IdP fingerprinting
  • tenant fingerprinting
  • okta enum
  • entra enum
  • azure AD enum
  • ADFS enum
  • SAML metadata
  • mobile recon
  • APK analysis
  • mobile attack surface
  • secret scanning
  • secret leak
  • leaked credential
  • github dorking
  • google dorking
  • bing dorking
  • DDG dorking
  • postman workspace
  • stack exchange OSINT
  • breach lookup
  • have I been pwned
  • HudsonRock cavalier
  • infostealer
  • dehashed
  • intelx
  • shodan recon
  • censys recon
  • certificate transparency
  • crt.sh
  • JARM
  • favicon mmh3
  • JS endpoint extraction
  • sourcemap leak
  • copy paste probes
  • curl one-liner
  • email security analysis
  • SPF DMARC DKIM
  • origin discovery
  • CDN bypass
  • WAF bypass
  • vendor product fingerprints
  • Citrix Netscaler
  • F5 BIG-IP
  • Pulse Secure
  • FortiGate
  • PaloAlto GlobalProtect
  • Cisco AnyConnect
  • VMware vCenter
  • cloud native fingerprint
  • Lambda function URL
  • Cloud Run
  • kubernetes exposure
  • kubelet
  • etcd
  • CI CD exposure
  • Jenkins recon
  • GitLab self-hosted
  • GitHub Actions secrets
  • documentation leak
  • Notion public
  • Confluence anonymous
  • Trello board
  • WHOIS RDAP
  • DNS record catalog
  • Wayback CDX
  • LinkedIn enumeration
  • job posting tech stack
  • Slack workspace discovery
  • Discord server discovery
  • npm token leak
  • PyPI token leak
  • Docker Hub leak
  • sat imagery physical recon
  • TLS deep audit
  • JA3 JA4
  • reverse DNS sweep
  • IPv6 enumeration
  • CVE prioritization
  • EPSS scoring
  • CISA KEV
  • vulnerability prioritization
  • tooling install
  • sector specific recon
  • healthcare DICOM
  • finance SWIFT
  • ICS SCADA
  • Modbus
  • BACnet
  • post discovery workflow
  • JWT triage
  • AWS key triage
  • GraphQL field suggestion
  • Anthropic API key
  • OpenAI API key
  • Microsoft 365 deep
  • Teams federation
  • SharePoint enum
  • OneDrive enum
  • hackerone reference
  • h1 hacktivity
  • disclosed reports
  • community bug reports
  • prior disclosures
  • bug bounty reference

Offensive OSINT — External Red-Team Arsenal

Companion skill: osint-methodology (the "how to think" skill). This skill is the "what to reach for." Use them together.

0. When to use / When NOT

Use this skill when:

  • You need concrete probe paths, wordlists, regexes, payloads, scoring rules, or tool URLs.
  • You're executing reconnaissance and need the actual technical reference (vs. methodology).
  • You're building a recon automation and need specific lists to seed it.

Do NOT use this skill when:

  • The user is asking for active exploitation, post-exploitation, or anything past reconnaissance.
  • The user is asking for defensive / blue-team detections.
  • The target's authorization isn't established — see §1.

1. Authorization & Legal Posture

For assets the operator owns or has written authorization to assess. Soft scope check before acting against an unverified third-party target — see methodology skill §1 for the full posture.

2. Confidence Levels

  • TENTATIVE — plausible based on indirect evidence (snippet-only dork match, single-source asset, inferred email pattern).
  • FIRM — directly observed (subdomain resolves, HEAD-confirmed bucket exists, banner returned).
  • CONFIRMED — verified via independent corroboration OR direct verification (live PMAK validation, multiple sources agree, listable bucket with object retrieval).

3. Output Format Conventions

Findings should carry: id, module, asset_key, category, severity (info/low/medium/high/critical), confidence, title, description, evidence (url + UTC timestamp + sha256 + raw ≤ 2 KiB), references, remediation. UTC timestamps everywhere.

4. Source Hygiene & Citations

URL + UTC timestamp + SHA-256 + tool version + run_id, every artifact. PNG screenshots, JSONL run logs, raw HTTP captures capped at 2 KiB body.

5. Do NOT

  • Don't paste creds/PII/session tokens into cloud LLMs.
  • Don't run destructive probes outside DEEP/--aggressive.
  • Don't use validated credentials for anything except read-only liveness check.
  • Don't single-source attribute.
  • Don't assume vendor labels are ground truth.

6. General OSINT (curated tool refs)

7. Search Engines

Tool Notes
Carrot2 Clusters results by topic
etools Metasearch
Kagi Privacy-first, non-personalized
Brave Search Independent index; Goggles for custom ranking
PDF Search PDF + table of contents
Google Fact Check Explorer Cross-site fact-check

8. Username & Email Investigation

Tool Purpose
Sherlock Username search across social networks
Maigret Profile collector by username
What's My Name Username search
Holehe Email registration check
Epieos Email pivots and metadata
OSINT Industries Email/username/phone lookups
Hunter.io Domain → emails
EmailRep Email reputation
Emailable Email verification
Mugetsu X/Twitter username history
RocketReach / Apollo Email enrichment + pattern guessing
PhoneInfoga Phone number intelligence

Browser extensions: GetProspect, SignalHire.

10. Phone Number OSINT

11. Email-Pattern Inference (TENTATIVE candidates)

Given a (first_name, last_name, domain), generate these 8 candidate addresses for breach pre-hits, phishing list curation, and downstream enrichment. Mark as TENTATIVE confidence until corroborated.

{first}.{last}@{domain}        # john.doe@example.com
{first}{last}@{domain}         # johndoe@example.com
{first}@{domain}               # john@example.com
{first[0]}{last}@{domain}      # jdoe@example.com
{first}.{last[0]}@{domain}     # john.d@example.com
{last}@{domain}                # doe@example.com
{first}_{last}@{domain}        # john_doe@example.com
{first}-{last}@{domain}        # john-doe@example.com

Lowercase before lookup. Strip diacritics for ASCII fallback. If the org uses a known pattern (e.g., Hunter.io shows {first}.{last} is dominant), prioritize that one and mark FIRM.

12. Email-Harvest Source Stack

Six parallel sources, dedup at the end:

  1. IntelX phonebook API — 2-step search + poll. Largest single source for breach-era addresses.
  2. Hunter.io — domain-search endpoint. ~25 free/month. Returns verified emails + roles.
  3. crt.sh — extract X.509 SAN extensions. Many certs include admin/contact emails.
  4. DuckDuckGo SERP scrape — HTML scrape of "@{target-domain}" results.
  5. Bing SERP scrape — same query, complementary index.
  6. Wayback CDX — historic snapshots of the target's homepage / contact / about pages often contain emails removed from the live site.

Email regex:

\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+\-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.\-]+\.[A-Za-z]{2,}\b

Noise filter (reject numeric-only locals):

^[0-9]+$

(Discards garbage like 12345@example.com from random tokens.)

13. Social Media

Platform Tool
Instagram Picuki — profile view without account
X/Twitter snscrape — preferred CLI scraper; Twint as fallback
Facebook Graph Search, sowsearch.info, lookup-id.com, whopostedwhat.com
Facebook (research) Meta Content Library — CrowdTangle successor (researcher-gated)
YouTube/Twitch Social Blade — analytics
TikTok Tokboard — trends + profile analytics
Reddit Reveddit — removed content; RedTrack.social — user history
Bluesky Firesky — real-time firehose; SkyView — follower graphs
Mastodon FediSearch — cross-instance search; Fedifinder — find Twitter users on Mastodon
Faces Search4Faces

14. Public Records & Company Information

14.1 RU registries

Rusprofile, Kontur.Focus (freemium), zakupki.gov.ru (procurement), EGRUL/EGRIP (official, captcha-gated).

14.2 CN registries + USCC + ICP

  • GSXT — gsxt.gov.cn National Enterprise Credit Info; cross-check with Tianyancha / Qichacha.
  • USCC (Unified Social Credit Code) — 18-character entity ID assigned to all CN legal entities. Format: <region:6><authority:2><type:1><serial:9>. Useful for joining GSXT records to ICP filings.
  • ICP Beian — beian.miit.gov.cn — every domain serving traffic in mainland CN must register an ICP filing; the filing links the domain to a USCC, which links to the legal entity in GSXT.
  • Workflow: target.cn domain → ICP lookup → USCC → GSXT → entity name + officers + adjacent registered entities.

14.3 Sanctions & Compliance

15. Breach & Leak Data

15.0.1 HudsonRock Cavalier — direct API recipe

The web UI wraps a public, unauthenticated JSON API. Hit it directly:

# By domain (canonical first call)
curl -sk -m 30 "https://cavalier.hudsonrock.com/api/json/v2/osint-tools/search-by-domain?domain=target.com" | jq .

# By email (single-account check)
curl -sk -m 30 "https://cavalier.hudsonrock.com/api/json/v2/osint-tools/search-by-email?email=alice@target.com" | jq .

# By URL (when target's app is the breach victim)
curl -sk -m 30 "https://cavalier.hudsonrock.com/api/json/v2/osint-tools/search-by-url?url=https://app.target.com" | jq .

PowerShell:

 = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "https://cavalier.hudsonrock.com/api/json/v2/osint-tools/search-by-domain?domain=" -TimeoutSec 30
"Employees: $(.employees) | Users: $(.users) | Third-party: $(.third_parties) | Total: $(.total)"
.data.employees_urls | Sort-Object -Property occurrence -Descending | Select-Object -First 20
.data.clients_urls   | Sort-Object -Property occurrence -Descending | Select-Object -First 15

Top-level JSON fields:

  • total — total stealer entries touching this domain.
  • totalStealers — global stealer-log corpus size (context only).
  • employees — count of <*>@<domain> accounts found.
  • users — count of accounts where the domain appeared as a visited URL (customers/vendors).
  • third_parties — accounts touching adjacent domains in the org.
  • data.employees_urls[] — {occurrence, type, url} — internal apps where employees were logging in when stolen. Subdomain hits here = recon gold.
  • data.clients_urls[] — same shape; user-facing apps (often reveals undocumented public portals).
  • data.stealer_families[] — {_key, _value} → which stealer (RedLine / Lumma / StealC / Vidar / Raccoon).
  • data.dates_compromised[] — {_key, _value} → temporal distribution.

Free-tier caveats (CRITICAL to know):

  • Subdomain hostnames in data.*_urls[] past the first few are redacted with asterisks (*****.target.com). Pivot to paid Cavalier tier or other sources for unredacted.
  • Free endpoint returns counts + sample URLs only. Cleartext passwords + emails are never in the free response.
  • Rate limit ~1 req/sec/IP; 429 on burst. Sleep 1s between calls.
  • For unredacted creds + bulk enumeration → paid Cavalier portal.

Severity mapping (per §15.1 + §15.2): employees ≥ 10 → CRITICAL, regardless of whether the breached service is still online (legacy Lotus Domino / on-prem mail decommissioned + cloud SSO migration → employees almost always reuse passwords → SSO_EXPOSURE escalates CRITICAL).

15.1 Domain-Level Breach Severity Mapping

When you query a breach corpus by domain, map the result to severity like so:

Stat Severity
≥ 10 employees compromised CRITICAL
1–9 employees compromised HIGH
≥ 1 end-user (non-employee) compromised MEDIUM
Domain seen in breach with 0 named accounts INFO

Employees vs end-users distinction: an employee account is <anything>@<target-domain> (the breach victim is the target's own staff). An end-user account is the target's customer who reused a password — useful for credential-stuffing risk awareness but not directly compromising the target's identity fabric.

15.2 SSO_EXPOSURE finding

When a discovered SSO tenant (Entra GUID / Okta slug / Google Workspace domain) intersects with the breach corpus on its domain → SSO_EXPOSURE finding, severity CRITICAL. Evidence: tenant ID + product + employee count + per-account source attribution.

Legacy-mail-decommissioned pattern (high-value variant):

If mail.<domain> / webmail.<domain> returns NXDOMAIN today but HudsonRock/HIBP corpus still has historical employee credentials against it AND autodiscover.<domain> resolves to Microsoft IPs (M365) or aspmx.l.google.com MX (Workspace), the org migrated from on-prem to cloud — and the stolen passwords almost certainly survived the migration via password reuse. Escalate to CRITICAL SSO_EXPOSURE even when the legacy host is dead.

Concrete triggers (all three together):

  1. Resolve-DnsName mail.<domain> -Type A → NXDOMAIN (legacy gone)
  2. HudsonRock corpus has employee URLs against the old host (e.g. mail.<domain>/names.nsf for Lotus Domino, mail.<domain>/owa/ for Exchange, mail.<domain>/iwaredir.nsf for iNotes, mail.<domain>/zimbra/ for Zimbra)
  3. Current MX → M365 / Google Workspace / Zoho cloud (DNS confirms migration)

Evidence pack: tenant GUID + breach count + 3+ legacy URLs from corpus + autodiscover Microsoft IPs + current MX. Recommend forced password rotation + MFA audit + Conditional Access review.

16. Pre-built Wordlists & Probe Paths

Copy-pasteable arsenals, severity-annotated where relevant.

16.1 Swagger / OpenAPI discovery — 28 paths

Probe each path on every alive webapp. GET (or HEAD if rate-limited).

swagger.json
swagger.yaml
swagger/v1/swagger.json
swagger/v2/swagger.json
swagger-ui.html
swagger-ui/
swagger-resources
api-docs
api-docs.json
api/swagger
api/swagger.json
api/swagger-ui.html
api/v1/swagger.json
api/v2/swagger.json
api/v3/api-docs
v2/api-docs
v3/api-docs
openapi.json
openapi.yaml
openapi/v1
openapi/v3
docs
redoc
rapidoc
api/docs
api/documentation
.well-known/openapi

Severity:

  • Reachable Swagger/OpenAPI spec without auth → HIGH LEAKY_API_SPEC (full endpoint enumeration leaks; often reveals undocumented internal APIs).
  • Behind auth but accessible to any authenticated user → MEDIUM (still discloses internal API surface).

16.2 GraphQL discovery — 13 paths

graphql
graphiql
api/graphql
v1/graphql
v2/graphql
query
api/query
gql
altair
playground
subscriptions
graphql/console
api/v1/graphql

Standard introspection POST body:

{
  "operationName": "IntrospectionQuery",
  "query": "query IntrospectionQuery { __schema { types { name kind fields { name type { name kind } } } queryType { name } mutationType { name } subscriptionType { name } } }"
}

Severity:

  • Introspection returns schema without auth → HIGH OPEN_GRAPHQL_API.
  • Field-suggestion enumeration possible (server returns "did you mean" for typo'd field names) → MEDIUM (re-derive partial schema even when introspection is disabled).
  • /graphql accepts batched queries ([...] request body) → MEDIUM (rate-limit bypass surface; auth bypass via mixed batches).

UI markers (lower severity but still discoverable):

  • HTML response contains graphiql, playground, apollo studio, altair → GraphiQL UI exposed (often shipped accidentally on prod).

16.3 High-risk ports — 35 services

For each open port, emit a finding with the severity and "why an attacker cares" below. Source for the open-port observation: Shodan InternetDB (free, 1 req/sec) is the recommended starting point.

Port Service Severity Why it matters
21 FTP HIGH Anonymous read often enabled; cleartext creds.
22 SSH LOW Banner discloses version; brute-force surface.
23 Telnet HIGH Cleartext protocol; should never be exposed.
25 SMTP LOW Open relay risk; version banner.
53 DNS LOW Recursion = DDoS amplifier; AXFR opportunism.
80 HTTP INFO Standard.
110 POP3 LOW Cleartext if no STARTTLS.
111 rpcbind MEDIUM NFS exports enumeration.
135 MS RPC HIGH Enum via Impacket.
139 NetBIOS-SSN HIGH File/printer enum.
143 IMAP LOW Cleartext if no STARTTLS.
161 SNMP HIGH Community strings often public/private; full device enum.
389 LDAP HIGH Anonymous bind = full directory dump.
443 HTTPS INFO Standard.
445 SMB CRITICAL EternalBlue, SMB relay, anonymous shares.
465 SMTPS LOW Banner.
514 rsyslog MEDIUM Log injection / DoS.
587 SMTP-MSA LOW Banner.
631 IPP/CUPS MEDIUM Print server enum / RCE in old CUPS.
873 rsync HIGH Modules often listable; backup data exposure.
1433 MSSQL HIGH Brute-force; xp_cmdshell.
1521 Oracle TNS HIGH Brute-force; SID enum.
2049 NFS HIGH World-readable exports.
2375 Docker API (unencrypted) CRITICAL Unauthenticated container/host takeover.
2376 Docker API (TLS) HIGH Cert validation bypass risk.
3000 Common dev / Grafana MEDIUM Often Grafana / Express dev with default creds.
3306 MySQL HIGH Brute-force; default root:"".
3389 RDP CRITICAL BlueKeep / DejaBlue / NLA bypass.
5432 PostgreSQL HIGH Brute-force; default postgres:postgres.
5601 Kibana HIGH Often unauthenticated; Elasticsearch pivot.
5900 VNC HIGH Often unauthenticated or weak password.
5984 CouchDB HIGH Default no auth; admin party.
6379 Redis CRITICAL No auth default; write authorized_keys for SSH.
7001 WebLogic HIGH Frequent CVEs (CVE-2020-14882, etc.).
8000 Common dev MEDIUM Django, common dev servers.
8080 HTTP-alt MEDIUM Tomcat, Jenkins, common proxy.
8443 HTTPS-alt MEDIUM Same as 8080.
8888 Common dev / Jupyter HIGH Jupyter often exposes interactive shell.
9090 Cockpit / Prometheus HIGH Server admin UI / metrics scraping.
9200 Elasticsearch CRITICAL Typically no auth.
9300 Elasticsearch transport HIGH Cluster join + RCE.
11211 memcached MEDIUM UDP DDoS amp; data dump.
27017 MongoDB CRITICAL No auth by default.
50070 Hadoop NameNode HIGH HDFS browse.

When Shodan InternetDB returns vulns[] for a port, escalate the finding severity by one tier and include the CVE list in evidence.

16.4 Missing security headers — 6 findings

For every alive webapp, audit response headers. Each missing header below = one finding.

Header Severity (default) Severity (sensitive path) Notes
Strict-Transport-Security MEDIUM HIGH Sensitive paths: /login, /signin, /sso, /admin, /auth.
Content-Security-Policy MEDIUM MEDIUM XSS impact mitigation gone.
X-Frame-Options LOW LOW Clickjacking. (CSP frame-ancestors is the modern replacement.)
X-Content-Type-Options LOW LOW MIME-sniff XSS.
Referrer-Policy INFO INFO Outbound link leakage.
Permissions-Policy INFO INFO Feature-policy hardening.

16.5 Always-on HTTP checks — 15 paths

Run these against every alive webapp regardless of Nuclei availability. Cheap; high signal.

Path Finding Severity Match logic
/.git/config Exposed .git repo CRITICAL Body contains [core], [remote, repositoryformatversion
/.git/HEAD Exposed .git/HEAD HIGH Body matches ^ref:\s
/.env Exposed .env CRITICAL Multiline regex ^\s*[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*\s*=
/server-status Apache server-status MEDIUM Body contains Apache Server Status or matching title
/server-info Apache mod_info MEDIUM Body contains Apache Server Information
/.DS_Store Exposed .DS_Store LOW Byte signature \x00\x00\x00\x01Bud1
/phpinfo.php phpinfo() leak HIGH Body contains phpinfo(), PHP Version, or matching title
/info.php phpinfo() (alt path) HIGH Same as above
/actuator/env Spring Boot /actuator/env CRITICAL Body contains "propertySources", systemProperties, systemEnvironment
/actuator/heapdump Spring Boot heapdump CRITICAL HPROF magic bytes / large binary download
/_cat/indices Elasticsearch open HIGH Returns index list
/console Jenkins script console HIGH Body contains Jenkins/Script Console
/manager/html Tomcat Manager HIGH Body contains Tomcat Web Application Manager
/wp-admin/install.php Orphaned WP install LOW Body contains WordPress Installation
/.well-known/security.txt Disclosure policy info INFO Parse contact + policy fields

Plus parse /robots.txt for Disallow: paths — those become the next-tier wordlist for that target.

16.6 SAML metadata — 5 paths

/saml/metadata
/FederationMetadata/2007-06/FederationMetadata.xml
/federationmetadata/2007-06/federationmetadata.xml
/simplesaml/saml2/idp/metadata.php
/auth/saml2/metadata

Reachable SAML metadata XML reveals: EntityID, signing certs (often pinned → cert-reuse pivot), SingleSignOnService URL, NameIDFormat. Mark as MISCONFIG (LOW severity unless metadata leaks internal hostnames or non-public certs, then MEDIUM).

16.7 SSO subdomain prefixes — 8 prefixes

Probe each against root domain + every sibling brand domain:

auth.{domain}
login.{domain}
sso.{domain}
idp.{domain}
iam.{domain}
identity.{domain}
accounts.{domain}
oauth.{domain}

Plus probe /.well-known/openid-configuration on every alive subdomain (regardless of prefix).

16.8 Cloud bucket permutation arsenal

6 prefixes:

""           # bare candidate
backup-
assets-
static-
dev-
prod-

15 suffixes:

""           # bare candidate
-backup
-assets
-static
-media
-data
-uploads
-dev
-prod
-staging
-logs
-private
-public
-dump
-archive

47 generic stems (filter unless combined with target-identifying token):

www, mail, email, app, apps, web, webmail, ftp, cdn, static, assets, media, img, images,
videos, download, downloads, upload, uploads, data, files, docs, support, help, kb,
blog, news, dev, test, staging, stg, qa, uat, sandbox, preprod, preview, vpn,
mx, smtp, imap, pop, dns, ns, ns1, ns2, mx1, mx2

Provider URL templates:

S3:

https://{candidate}.s3.amazonaws.com/
https://{candidate}.s3-{region}.amazonaws.com/      # try us-east-1, us-west-2, eu-west-1, ap-southeast-1 first
https://s3.{region}.amazonaws.com/{candidate}/

GCS:

https://{candidate}.storage.googleapis.com/
https://storage.googleapis.com/{candidate}/

Azure Blob:

https://{candidate}.blob.core.windows.net/

Probe technique: HEAD first → 200/301 = exists, 403 = exists private, 404 = skip. On exists, GET root → if XML/JSON object listing returns, CRITICAL PUBLIC_CLOUD_BUCKET. Direct-URL object reads but not listable → HIGH PUBLIC_CLOUD_BUCKET_OBJECT_READ.

16.9 JS guess-paths for endpoint discovery

Probe these paths on every alive webapp (in addition to scraped <script src=...>):

/main.js
/app.js
/bundle.js
/runtime.js
/index.js
/vendor.js
/_next/static/_buildManifest.js
/_next/static/_ssgManifest.js
/static/js/main.js
/static/js/bundle.js
/assets/index.js
/static/js/main.<hash>.js                 # try hash discovery via 404 patterns

For every found JS, also try <jsfile>.map for sourcemap leaks (HIGH INFO_DISCLOSURE).

16.10 Endpoint extraction regex tiers

Three tiers, run in order on every JS body + every sourcesContent[] blob:

Tier 1 — generic quoted paths:

['"`](/[A-Za-z0-9_\-./{}\[\]?=&%:]+)['"`]

Match group: the path. High recall, lots of false positives — apply allowlist downstream.

Tier 2 — API-ish paths (biased filter on tier 1):

['"`](/(?:api|graphql|gql|v\d+|swagger|openapi|rest|services|internal|admin|auth|oauth|user|users|account|accounts|search|export|upload|file|files|download|webhook|hooks|callback|admin)/[A-Za-z0-9_\-./{}\[\]?=&%:]+)['"`]

Tier 3 — fully-qualified URLs:

\bhttps?://[A-Za-z0-9.\-]+\.[A-Za-z]{2,}(?::\d+)?[/A-Za-z0-9_\-./{}\[\]?=&%:#]*

Dedup on (method, normalized-path-template) where the template replaces /123/ with /{id}/ etc.

16.11 Internal-host leakage regexes

Run on every JS body + sourcesContent + APK strings + manifest:

RFC1918:

\b(?:10\.(?:\d{1,3}\.){2}\d{1,3}|172\.(?:1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\.(?:\d{1,3})\.(?:\d{1,3})|192\.168\.(?:\d{1,3})\.(?:\d{1,3})|127\.(?:\d{1,3}\.){2}\d{1,3})\b

Internal DNS suffixes:

\b[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9\-]{0,62}\.(?:internal|corp|lan|intranet|local|prod|staging|dev|qa|test)\b

Kubernetes service DNS:

\b[A-Za-z0-9\-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9\-]+\.svc(?:\.cluster\.local)?\b

Each match → MEDIUM INFO_DISCLOSURE. Aggregate per host: if many matches share the same internal subdomain, that's a recon seed for any future internal phase.

16.12 Subdomain-takeover provider fingerprints (summary, 27 providers)

Watch for these CNAME targets + the corresponding "available for claim" response signature:

Provider CNAME pattern Takeover signature
GitHub Pages *.github.io There isn't a GitHub Pages site here.
Heroku *.herokuapp.com No such app
AWS S3 *.s3*.amazonaws.com NoSuchBucket
AWS CloudFront *.cloudfront.net Bad request w/ specific X-Amz error
Azure (multiple) *.azurewebsites.net, *.blob.core.windows.net, *.cloudapp.net, *.trafficmanager.net Various per-product 404 patterns
Shopify shops.myshopify.com Sorry, this shop is currently unavailable.
Squarespace *.squarespace.com No Such Account
Tumblr *.tumblr.com Whatever you were looking for doesn't currently exist.
WordPress *.wordpress.com Do you want to register *.wordpress.com?
Fastly various Fastly-specific 404
Pantheon *.pantheonsite.io The gods are wise, but do not know of the site...
Surge.sh *.surge.sh project not found
Bitbucket Pages *.bitbucket.io Repository not found
Tilda *.tilda.ws Please renew your subscription
Strikingly *.s.strikinglydns.com PAGE NOT FOUND
Smartling *.smartling.com Domain is not configured
Ngrok *.ngrok.io Tunnel not found
Webflow *.webflow.io Site not found
Zendesk *.zendesk.com Help Center Closed
Cargo *.cargocollective.com 404 Not Found (with cargo branding)
Statuspage *.statuspage.io Not found
Intercom *.intercom.help Not found
Helpjuice *.helpjuice.com Not found
Helpscout *.helpscoutdocs.com Not found
Tictail *.tictail.com Not found
Brightcove *.brightcovegallery.com Not found
Smugmug various Not found

For full per-provider detection signatures + edge cases, use SubdomainX or Subzy/Subjack against a freshly-fetched fingerprint database.

16.13 Copy-Paste Probes (curl one-liners)

Every probe path in §16.1–16.12 with a runnable curl. Defaults: -sk (silent + ignore TLS errors), -m 10 (10s max), -o /tmp/r (response body to disk), -w '%{http_code}\n' (print status code), -A "Mozilla/5.0" (UA — change per persona).

Always-on HTTP checks (§16.5):

T="https://target.example"

# .git/config (CRITICAL)
curl -sk -m 10 "/.git/config" | grep -E '\[core\]|\[remote|repositoryformatversion'

# .git/HEAD (HIGH)
curl -sk -m 10 "/.git/HEAD" | grep -E '^ref:'

# .env (CRITICAL)
curl -sk -m 10 "/.env" | grep -E '^[[:space:]]*[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*[[:space:]]*='

# Apache /server-status (MEDIUM)
curl -sk -m 10 "/server-status" | grep -i 'Apache Server Status'

# Apache /server-info (MEDIUM)
curl -sk -m 10 "/server-info" | grep -i 'Apache Server Information'

# .DS_Store (LOW)
curl -sk -m 10 "/.DS_Store" -o /tmp/dsstore && file /tmp/dsstore | grep -i 'data'

# phpinfo.php (HIGH)
curl -sk -m 10 "/phpinfo.php" | grep -E 'phpinfo\(\)|PHP Version'

# info.php (HIGH)
curl -sk -m 10 "/info.php" | grep -E 'phpinfo\(\)|PHP Version'

# Spring Boot /actuator/env (CRITICAL)
curl -sk -m 10 "/actuator/env" | grep -E '"propertySources"|systemProperties|systemEnvironment'

# Spring Boot /actuator/heapdump (CRITICAL — saves binary; check size)
curl -sk -m 30 "/actuator/heapdump" -o /tmp/heap && file /tmp/heap | grep -i 'HPROF\|data'

# Elasticsearch open (HIGH)
curl -sk -m 10 "/_cat/indices?v"

# Jenkins script console (HIGH)
curl -sk -m 10 "/script" | grep -iE 'Jenkins|Script Console'

# Tomcat manager (HIGH)
curl -sk -m 10 "/manager/html" -w '%{http_code}\n' | tail -1     # 401 = present + auth-gated; 200 = no auth

# WordPress orphan installer (LOW)
curl -sk -m 10 "/wp-admin/install.php" | grep -i 'WordPress Installation'

# security.txt (INFO)
curl -sk -m 10 "/.well-known/security.txt"

SSO subdomain prefixes (§16.7):

D="target.example"
for prefix in auth login sso idp iam identity accounts oauth; do
  echo "=== . ==="
  curl -sk -m 10 "https://./.well-known/openid-configuration" -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n'
done

# Generic OIDC discovery on any host:
curl -sk -m 10 "https:///.well-known/openid-configuration" | jq .

SAML metadata paths (§16.6):

H="target.example.com"
for p in /saml/metadata \
         /FederationMetadata/2007-06/FederationMetadata.xml \
         /federationmetadata/2007-06/federationmetadata.xml \
         /simplesaml/saml2/idp/metadata.php \
         /auth/saml2/metadata; do
  echo "===  ==="
  curl -sk -m 10 "https://" -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} %{size_download}\n'
done

Cloud bucket probes (§16.8):

B="candidate-bucket-name"

# S3 (us-east-1 first)
curl -sk -m 10 -I "https://.s3.amazonaws.com/" -w 'STATUS:%{http_code}\n' | head -20
# If 200/301: list objects
curl -sk -m 10 "https://.s3.amazonaws.com/?list-type=2" | head -50

# S3 region-specific
for r in us-east-1 us-west-2 eu-west-1 ap-southeast-1; do
  curl -sk -m 10 -I "https://.s3-.amazonaws.com/" -w ": %{http_code}\n"
done

# GCS
curl -sk -m 10 -I "https://.storage.googleapis.com/"
curl -sk -m 10 "https://storage.googleapis.com//"

# Azure Blob
curl -sk -m 10 -I "https://.blob.core.windows.net/"
curl -sk -m 10 "https://.blob.core.windows.net/?comp=list"

GraphQL introspection POST (§16.2):

H="https://target.example/graphql"

curl -sk -m 15 -X POST "" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "operationName":"IntrospectionQuery",
    "query":"query IntrospectionQuery { __schema { types { name kind fields { name type { name kind } } } queryType { name } mutationType { name } subscriptionType { name } } }"
  }' | jq '.data.__schema.types | length'

Read-only secret validators (§23):

# Postman PMAK
curl -sk -m 10 -H "X-Api-Key: PMAK-..." https://api.getpostman.com/me | jq .

# AWS (use boto3 instead of curl — pre-signing complexity)
python3 -c "import boto3; print(boto3.client('sts', aws_access_key_id='AKIA...', aws_secret_access_key='...').get_caller_identity())"

# GitHub PAT (note scope header)
curl -sk -m 10 -H "Authorization: token ghp_..." https://api.github.com/user -D /tmp/h | jq -r '.login,.email'
grep -i 'X-OAuth-Scopes' /tmp/h

# Slack
curl -sk -m 10 -H "Authorization: Bearer xoxb-..." -X POST https://slack.com/api/auth.test | jq .

# Anthropic (read-only validation)
curl -sk -m 10 -H "x-api-key: sk-ant-..." -H "anthropic-version: 2023-06-01" https://api.anthropic.com/v1/models | jq '.data | length'

# OpenAI
curl -sk -m 10 -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-..." https://api.openai.com/v1/models | jq '.data | length'

# npm
curl -sk -m 10 -H "Authorization: Bearer npm_..." https://registry.npmjs.org/-/whoami | jq .

# Atlassian (account)
curl -sk -m 10 -u "email:ATATT3xFfGF0_..." https://your-domain.atlassian.net/rest/api/3/myself | jq .

# DataDog (API + APP key both required)
curl -sk -m 10 -H "DD-API-KEY: ..." -H "DD-APPLICATION-KEY: ..." https://api.datadoghq.com/api/v1/validate | jq .

Bulk webapp triage (httpx, faster than curl loop):

# Install: go install github.com/projectdiscovery/httpx/cmd/httpx@latest
echo "target.example" | httpx -sc -title -tech-detect -web-server -ip -cdn -follow-redirects

# With probe list
cat subdomains.txt | httpx -sc -title -tech-detect -path /actuator/env,/.git/config,/.env -mc 200,301,403

Save responses for evidence:

mkdir -p evidence/$(date -u +%Y%m%d)
T="https://target.example"
P="/actuator/env"
TS=$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)
SAFE_NAME=$(echo "" | tr '/:' '_')
curl -sk -m 10 "" -o "evidence/$(date -u +%Y%m%d)/_.body" \
  -D "evidence/$(date -u +%Y%m%d)/_.headers"
sha256sum "evidence/$(date -u +%Y%m%d)/_".* > "evidence/$(date -u +%Y%m%d)/_.sha256"

16.14 Email Security Analysis (SPF/DMARC/DKIM/BIMI/MTA-STS/DNSSEC)

Spoof feasibility + SaaS tenant inference from a target's email DNS.

SPF lookup + parsing:

D="target.example"
dig +short TXT "" | grep -i 'v=spf1'

Common SPF parsing checklist:

  • Ends in -all (hardfail) → strict; major providers reject spoofs.
  • Ends in ~all (softfail) → spam folder for spoofs.
  • Ends in ?all or no all → permissive; spoofs likely deliver.
  • Includes (include:) reveal SaaS tenants:
    • include:_spf.google.com → Google Workspace.
    • include:spf.protection.outlook.com → Microsoft 365.
    • include:_spf.salesforce.com → Salesforce.
    • include:mail.zendesk.com → Zendesk customer.
    • include:sendgrid.net → SendGrid customer.
    • include:mailgun.org → Mailgun customer.
    • include:_spf.atlassian.net → Atlassian Cloud.
    • include:amazonses.com → AWS SES.
    • include:mktomail.com → Marketo.
    • include:_spf.intuit.com → Intuit (QuickBooks/Mailchimp).
    • include:spf.mandrillapp.com → Mandrill.
    • include:_spf.workday.com → Workday.

If SPF includes ≥10 mechanisms (max-lookups limit) → SPF eval likely fails → spoofs may pass. Tools: spfquery, spftools (online), dig +trace.

DMARC policy + alignment:

dig +short TXT "_dmarc."

Parse for:

  • p= → primary policy (none, quarantine, reject).
  • sp= → subdomain policy (defaults to p=).
  • aspf= / adkim= → alignment mode (r=relaxed, s=strict).
  • pct= → percentage of mail to which policy applies.
  • rua= / ruf= → reporting addresses (often reveals SaaS DMARC vendors: dmarcian, valimail, Agari, easydmarc).

Severity:

  • p=none → spoof-feasible, downgrade trust → MEDIUM finding.
  • p=quarantine pct<100 → partial enforcement → LOW.
  • p=reject + aspf=s + adkim=s → well-postured → no finding.

DKIM key discovery:

DKIM selectors aren't well-known; common patterns:

for selector in default google selector1 selector2 mail email k1 dkim s1 s2 mta1 mta2 \
                amazonses 20240101 20230101 mailchimp sendgrid mxvault; do
  echo "===  ==="
  dig +short TXT "._domainkey."
done

If a key returns: extract p=<base64> and check key length. RSA-1024 → MEDIUM (deprecated; should be 2048+). Missing or rotated infrequently → LOW finding.

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification):

dig +short TXT "default._bimi."

If present + p=reject DMARC → brand-impersonation defense in inbox UI. Absence is LOW only (operational, not exploitable).

MTA-STS (Mail Transfer Agent Strict Transport Security):

dig +short TXT "_mta-sts."
curl -sk -m 10 "https://mta-sts./.well-known/mta-sts.txt"

If neither responds → MX-server TLS not enforced; MITM-able. LOW finding. If mode=enforce present and policy file matches → well-postured.

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting):

dig +short TXT "_smtp._tls."

DNSSEC validation:

dig +dnssec "" SOA | grep -E 'flags|RRSIG'
delv "" 2>&1 | grep -i 'fully validated\|insecur'

If delv returns "insecure" → DNSSEC not enabled (LOW finding; doesn't enable spoof but is hardening gap).

MX → IdP / mail-host inference:

dig +short MX ""
MX pattern IdP / hosting
aspmx.l.google.com, *.googlemail.com Google Workspace
*.mail.protection.outlook.com Microsoft 365
*.mail.eo.outlook.com Microsoft 365 (older)
*.zoho.com Zoho Mail
*.yandex.net Yandex 360
*.fastmail.com Fastmail
*.proofpoint.com, *.pphosted.com Proofpoint (M365 user with Proofpoint inbound)
*.mimecast.com, *.mimecast-eu.com Mimecast
*.barracudanetworks.com Barracuda
Self-hosted IPs in target ASN On-prem mail server (often Exchange)

DMARC reporting-vendor inference (parse rua= / ruf=):

RUA/RUF host Vendor Implication
*.dmarcian.com dmarcian DMARC reporting customer
*.valimail.com, *.dmarc-rua.com Valimail DMARC reporting customer
*.kdmarc.com Kratikal kDMARC Indian DMARC vendor; common in IN orgs
*.agari.com Agari (Fortra) Email security vendor
*.easydmarc.com EasyDMARC DMARC reporting customer
*.dmarcanalyzer.com DMARC Analyzer Reporting customer
*.postmarkapp.com Postmark DMARC reporting addon
<addr>@<target-domain> Self-hosted reporting Internal mailbox; sometimes leaks team-name (itg@, secops@, dmarc@)

Capture the vendor + the internal RUA mailbox. Both are leak surfaces (vendor compromise = DMARC bypass; internal mailbox = phishing target).

Windows / PowerShell parallel for the entire §16.14 audit:

PS 5.1 Resolve-DnsName does not accept -Type CAA (use PowerShell 7+ or nslookup -type=CAA <domain>). Otherwise:

 = "target.example"
"=== SPF ==="; (Resolve-DnsName  -Type TXT -EA SilentlyContinue | ? { .Strings -match 'v=spf1' }).Strings
"=== DMARC ==="; (Resolve-DnsName "_dmarc." -Type TXT -EA SilentlyContinue).Strings
"=== MTA-STS ==="; (Resolve-DnsName "_mta-sts." -Type TXT -EA SilentlyContinue).Strings
"=== TLS-RPT ==="; (Resolve-DnsName "_smtp._tls." -Type TXT -EA SilentlyContinue).Strings
"=== BIMI ==="; (Resolve-DnsName "default._bimi." -Type TXT -EA SilentlyContinue).Strings
"=== MX ==="; Resolve-DnsName  -Type MX -EA SilentlyContinue | Select NameExchange,Preference
"=== DKIM common selectors ==="
foreach ( in @("default","google","selector1","selector2","mail","email","k1","dkim","s1","s2","amazonses","mailchimp","sendgrid","mxvault","20240101","zoho","zmail","outlook","o365")) {
   = Resolve-DnsName "._domainkey." -Type TXT -EA SilentlyContinue
  if () { ": FOUND" }
}
"=== CAA (PS 5.1 fallback) ==="; nslookup -type=CAA  2>

16.15 Origin Discovery / CDN Bypass

If the target is behind Cloudflare/Akamai/Fastly/CloudFront, their CDN IPs are well-defined. Find IPs not in those ranges that serve the same site = origin.

Cloudflare IPv4 ranges:

https://www.cloudflare.com/ips-v4

Akamai ASNs: AS16625, AS20940, AS21342, AS21357.
Fastly: AS54113.
AWS CloudFront: published in https://ip-ranges.amazonaws.com/ip-ranges.json filter service:CLOUDFRONT.

Origin discovery via DNS history:

# SecurityTrails (paid)
curl -sk -H "APIKEY: ..." \
  "https://api.securitytrails.com/v1/history//dns/a" | jq '.records[] | {ip:.values[].ip, first_seen, last_seen}'

Free alternatives:

# Validin
curl -sk "https://app.validin.com/api/axon//dns" | jq .

# RiskIQ Community (free tier; auth required)
curl -sk -u "user:apikey" "https://api.riskiq.net/pt/v2/dns/passive?query=" | jq .

Filter the result: any historical A record IP not in current CDN ranges = origin candidate.

Origin via certificate SAN pivot (Censys):

# Censys (free 250 queries/month with key)
censys search "services.tls.certificates.leaf_data.subject.common_name: AND NOT services.tls.certificates.leaf_data.issuer.common_name:'Cloudflare'"

Or via crt.sh + manual IP check:

curl -sk "https://crt.sh/?q=%25.&output=json" | jq -r '.[].name_value' | sort -u

Origin via favicon hash (Shodan):

# Compute favicon mmh3
python3 -c "
import urllib.request, codecs, mmh3
data = urllib.request.urlopen('https://target.example/favicon.ico').read()
b64 = codecs.encode(data, 'base64')
print(mmh3.hash(b64))"

# Search Shodan
shodan search "http.favicon.hash:<computed-hash>" --fields ip_str,port,org

Cross-reference with CDN ranges; non-CDN matches = origin candidates.

Origin via JARM:

# Compute JARM
python3 -c "
import jarm
print(jarm.scan('target.example'))
" 2>/dev/null || echo "Install: pip install pyjarm"

# Search Shodan for matching JARM
shodan search "ssl.jarm:<jarm-hash>" --fields ip_str,port

Origin via Host-header probe (validate candidate):

CANDIDATE_IP="203.0.113.42"
curl -sk -m 10 -H "Host: target.example.com" "https:///" -o /tmp/candidate.html
diff <(curl -sk -m 10 https://target.example.com/) /tmp/candidate.html | head -50

If small/no diff → confirmed origin. Document with detectability=low.

Origin via auxiliary subdomains (often skip CDN):

for sub in mail smtp ftp sftp cpanel webmail direct origin direct-connect noproxy \
           dev staging stg uat preprod sandbox preview origin-www old-www legacy \
           server srv host1 host2 vps server1; do
  echo "=== . ==="
  dig +short A "."
done | grep -vE '^(===|$)' | sort -u

Cross-reference any returned IP against CDN ranges.

Origin via email-header bounce:

Send mail to <random>@ from a sock-puppet account. The bounce often includes Received: headers showing the inbound mail server's actual IP — sometimes co-located with web origin.

Origin via misconfigured CDN error pages:

Some CDN 5xx error pages historically leaked upstream details. Trigger errors and inspect:

# Trigger CDN-side 5xx (oversized request, malformed Host)
curl -sk -m 10 -H "Host: " "https://target.example/" -o /tmp/err.html
curl -sk -m 10 -H "X-Forwarded-For: $(python3 -c 'print("a"*8000)')" "https://target.example/"
grep -iE 'origin|upstream|server|backend|cf-ray' /tmp/err.html

16.16 Vendor Product Fingerprints

Common edge appliances / products on the target's perimeter, with fingerprint paths and notes on common CVEs.

Product Fingerprint paths Notes
Citrix Netscaler / Gateway /vpn/index.html, /logon/LogonPoint/tmindex.html, /citrix/ Version in HTML; CVE-2023-3519 (RCE), CVE-2019-19781 (path traversal RCE) — both KEV-listed.
F5 BIG-IP TMUI /tmui/login.jsp, /mgmt/tm/sys/ Banner reveals version; CVE-2022-1388 (auth bypass), CVE-2023-46747 — KEV-listed.
Cisco ASA / AnyConnect /+CSCOE+/, /CSCOE/index.html, /webvpn.html, /+CSCOE+/portal.html CVE-2020-3452 (file read), CVE-2018-0101 (RCE).
Pulse Secure / Ivanti Connect /dana-na/, /dana-na/auth/url_default/welcome.cgi, /api/v1/ CVE-2024-21887 (KEV), CVE-2023-46805 (KEV) — chained command injection.
FortiGate / FortiOS /remote/login, /remote/info, /api/v2/ CVE-2022-42475 (RCE, KEV), CVE-2024-21762 (RCE, KEV).
PaloAlto GlobalProtect /global-protect/, /global-protect/portal/css/login.css, /api/?type=keygen CVE-2024-3400 (RCE, KEV), CVE-2019-1579.
VMware Horizon /portal/info.jsp, /broker/xml, /login.jsp log4shell exposure (CVE-2021-44228, KEV).
VMware vCenter /sdk, /ui/, /vsphere-client/, /websso/SAML2/ CVE-2021-21972 (RCE, KEV), CVE-2021-22005.
VMware ESXi /sdk, /ui/, /folder CVE-2021-21974 (heap overflow → ESXiArgs ransomware, KEV).
Microsoft Exchange OWA /owa/, /ews/exchange.asmx, /ecp/ ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473), ProxyLogon (CVE-2021-26855), ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040) — all KEV.
WatchGuard Firebox /auth/, /wgcgi.cgi CVE-2022-26318 (CGI).
SonicWall SMA /cgi-bin/welcome, /__api__/v1/, /diagnostics/ CVE-2021-20016, CVE-2024-40766 (KEV).
Sophos UTM/XG/XGS /userportal/, /webconsole/, /cgi-bin/ CVE-2022-1040 (RCE, KEV).
Check Point R80/R81 /sslvpn/portal/, /clients/ CVE-2024-24919 (KEV).
Zoho ManageEngine /RestAPI/Login, /api/json/v2/ Multiple RCE CVEs; check version.
Atlassian Confluence /confluence/, /login.action, /rest/api/space CVE-2022-26134 (OGNL RCE, KEV), CVE-2023-22515 (KEV).
Atlassian Jira /secure/Dashboard.jspa, /rest/api/2/serverInfo Multiple CVEs; check version.
GitLab self-hosted /users/sign_in, /-/oauth/applications, /help Version in HTML footer; CVE-2021-22205 (RCE, KEV).
Telerik UI /Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rau CVE-2017-9248, CVE-2019-18935 — old but still found.
ConnectWise ScreenConnect /SetupWizard.aspx, /Bin/SetupWizard.aspx CVE-2024-1709 (auth bypass, KEV).
SolarWinds Orion /Orion/Login.aspx SUNBURST supply-chain (CVE-2020-10148).
Kaseya VSA /dl.asp, /userFilterTableRpt.asp CVE-2021-30116 (REvil supply-chain).
Microsoft IIS / OWA misc Server: Microsoft-IIS/<version> Old versions = old CVEs; check.
Cisco Smart Install port 4786 open CVE-2018-0171 (smart install client mode RCE).

Per-vendor probe pattern:

T="https://target.example"
# Citrix
curl -sk -m 10 "/vpn/index.html" -o /tmp/c1 -w '%{http_code}\n'
grep -iE 'NetScaler|Citrix|version' /tmp/c1
# F5
curl -sk -m 10 "/tmui/login.jsp" -o /tmp/c2 -w '%{http_code}\n'
grep -iE 'BIG-IP|version' /tmp/c2
# (etc — repeat per product)

Auto-fingerprint with Nuclei:

nuclei -u  -t http/technologies/ -severity info,low,medium,high,critical
nuclei -u  -t http/cves/ -severity high,critical -etags fuzz

16.17 Cloud-Native Service Fingerprints

Modern apps deploy on serverless / managed services. Fingerprint the platform from the URL pattern.

Provider URL pattern Notes
AWS Lambda Function URL *.lambda-url.<region>.on.aws Direct invocation; check IAM auth posture.
AWS App Runner *.<region>.awsapprunner.com Managed container; usually behind auth.
AWS API Gateway *.execute-api.<region>.amazonaws.com REST/HTTP/WebSocket; check authorizer config.
AWS CloudFront d{14}\.cloudfront\.net Distribution; origin behind it (see §16.15).
AWS ALB / ELB *.elb.<region>.amazonaws.com Behind = EC2 / ECS.
AWS Amplify *.amplifyapp.com Static + Lambda backend.
Google Cloud Run *.run.app (and *.<region>.run.app) Container; check public-vs-IAM auth.
Google Cloud Functions *.cloudfunctions.net, *.<region>-<project>.cloudfunctions.net Serverless.
Google App Engine *.appspot.com Older serverless.
Azure Functions *.azurewebsites.net (also App Service) Function App behind same domain pattern.
Azure Container Apps *.azurecontainerapps.io Containers.
Azure Static Web Apps *.azurestaticapps.net Static + Functions.
Vercel *.vercel.app, *.now.sh (legacy) Frontend + serverless.
Netlify *.netlify.app, *.netlify.com Frontend + functions.
Cloudflare Workers *.workers.dev Edge functions.
Cloudflare Pages *.pages.dev Static + functions.
Heroku *.herokuapp.com Dynos.
Render *.onrender.com Container/static.
Fly.io *.fly.dev Edge containers.
Railway *.railway.app App platform.
DigitalOcean App Platform *.ondigitalocean.app Static + container.

For each pattern:

  • Confirm public vs auth-required (HEAD / GET).
  • Check CORS posture.
  • For Lambda Function URLs / Cloud Run / Cloud Functions: check whether IAM auth is enforced (anonymous invocation = HIGH finding).
  • For static + functions hybrids (Vercel/Netlify/Cloudflare Pages): the function paths are usually /api/*; enumerate via JS extraction.

16.18 Container & Kubernetes Exposure

Increasingly common; often forgotten when behind a NAT.

Target Port Probe Severity if exposed
Docker API (unencrypted) 2375 curl -sk -m 5 http://:2375/v1.40/info CRITICAL (container/host takeover)
Docker API (TLS) 2376 curl -sk -m 5 https://:2376/v1.40/info HIGH (cert validation bypass possible)
Kubernetes API server 6443 / 8443 curl -sk -m 5 https://:6443/api HIGH if system:anonymous returns non-403
Kubernetes Dashboard 8001 / 9090 / 30000+ curl -sk -m 5 http://:8001/api/v1/namespaces/kube-system/services/kubernetes-dashboard HIGH if reachable
kubelet 10250 (HTTPS), 10255 (HTTP, deprecated) curl -sk -m 5 https://:10250/pods CRITICAL (no auth = pod exec)
etcd 2379 (client), 2380 (peer) curl -sk -m 5 https://:2379/v2/keys/ (v2) or etcdctl --endpoints=:2379 get / (v3) CRITICAL (cluster state + secrets)
kube-proxy 10256 curl http://:10256/healthz INFO
kube-controller-manager 10257 curl https://:10257/metrics MEDIUM
kube-scheduler 10259 curl https://:10259/metrics MEDIUM
cAdvisor 4194 (deprecated) curl http://:4194/metrics LOW (resource metrics)
Helm Tiller (Helm 2 — deprecated but found) 44134 helm --host :44134 list HIGH (Tiller had cluster-admin)

Public container registries to check for leaks:

Registry Search pattern
Docker Hub https://hub.docker.com/search?q=<target-keyword>&type=image
Quay (Red Hat) https://quay.io/search?q=<target-keyword>
GitHub Container Registry (GHCR) enumerable via GitHub API: https://api.github.com/orgs/<org>/packages?package_type=container
Amazon ECR Public https://gallery.ecr.aws/?searchTerm=<keyword>
Azure Container Registry (public) varies; check for *.azurecr.io
Google Container Registry (public) https://console.cloud.google.com/gcr/images/<project>?project=<project>

Per-image scan workflow:

  1. docker pull <registry>/<image>:<tag> (or skopeo inspect).
  2. docker save <image> -o /tmp/img.tar.
  3. Extract layers; scan with secret catalog (§17).
  4. Inspect Dockerfile history (docker history <image>) — sometimes reveals build args or COPY of secrets.

16.19 CI/CD Platform Exposure

Platform Common exposure Probe
Jenkins /script (Groovy console = RCE if no auth), /asynchPeople/, /jnlpJars/jenkins-cli.jar, /computer/, /job/<name>/api/json curl -sk -m 10 "/script" and curl -sk -m 10 "/asynchPeople/api/json"
GitLab self-hosted /users/sign_in (version in HTML), /-/oauth/applications (auth-required), /api/v4/version, /-/snippets/<id>/raw curl -sk -m 10 "/api/v4/version"
GitHub Actions workflow files .github/workflows/*.yml in any public repo Search via GitHub code search: path:.github/workflows extension:yml secrets
CircleCI config .circleci/config.yml in any repo Search: path:.circleci/config.yml
TeamCity /login.html, /agent.html?agentId=*, /admin/admin.html curl -sk -m 10 "/login.html" | grep -i 'TeamCity' — version disclosure. CVE-2024-27198 (KEV).
Bamboo (Atlassian) /userlogin.action, /rest/api/latest/info curl -sk -m 10 "/rest/api/latest/info"
Drone CI /api/info, /login curl -sk -m 10 "/api/info"
Travis CI (legacy) .travis.yml in repos; https://api.travis-ci.com/repos/<owner>/<repo> API often exposes build env.
Argo CD /api/version, /applications curl -sk -m 10 "/api/version". Check anonymous-auth posture.
Tekton /apis/tekton.dev/v1beta1/pipelineruns (K8s native) Enumerate via K8s API.
Spinnaker /gate/info, /applications curl -sk -m 10 "/gate/info"
Buildkite per-org dashboards; usually behind auth. Check public agents page.

GitHub Actions secret-leak patterns to look for in workflows:

# Anti-pattern: secret echoed to log
run: echo "${{ secrets.MY_API_KEY }}"

# Anti-pattern: secret in environment without mask
env:
  KEY: ${{ secrets.MY_API_KEY }}
run: ./deploy.sh   # script may echo 

# Anti-pattern: pull_request_target with checkout of fork code (CVE class)
on: pull_request_target
jobs:
  test:
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
        with:
          ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}   # checks out fork code with secrets in env

16.20 Documentation / Wiki Leak Paths

Public-share features on collaboration platforms regularly leak.

Platform URL pattern What's exposed
Notion (publish page) *.notion.site/<slug> or notion.so/<workspace>/<page-id> Public page; sometimes whole workspaces published by accident.
Confluence Cloud (anonymous) <target>.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/ Public spaces; check /wiki/display/<SPACE>/.
Atlassian Service Desk <target>.atlassian.net/servicedesk/customer/portal/<N> Sometimes lists all internal request types.
Trello board https://trello.com/b/<id>/<slug> Public board with cards; check via Google site:trello.com "".
Asana public project https://app.asana.com/0/<id>/<id> Public project view.
ReadTheDocs <project>.readthedocs.io Hosted docs; "private builds" sometimes default to public.
GitBook <workspace>.gitbook.io/<book>/ Published docs; sometimes contain internal SOPs.
MkDocs / Docusaurus on subdomain docs.<target> Often contains internal architecture diagrams + setup notes.
Slab <workspace>.slab.com/posts/<id> Published posts.
Coda coda.io/d/<doc-id> Public docs.
Miro https://miro.com/app/board/<id>/ Public boards (often architecture diagrams).
Lucidchart https://lucid.app/lucidchart/<id>/view Public diagrams.
Figma https://www.figma.com/file/<key>/ Public design files; sometimes leak product spec.
GitHub Wiki github.com/<org>/<repo>/wiki Public wikis; check stale ones.
Linear linear.app/<workspace>/issue/<id> Public issues (rare but happens).
Confluence anonymous server <target>/confluence/, <target>/wiki/ (self-hosted) Anonymous read sometimes left on.
Monday.com view.monday.com/<id> Shared boards.
Wrike app.wrike.com/external/<id> External-shared spaces.

Dork-driven discovery:

site:notion.site "{target}"
site:notion.so "{target}"
site:atlassian.net "{target}"
site:trello.com "{target}"
site:miro.com "{target}"
site:lucid.app "{target}"
site:figma.com "{target}"
site:asana.com "{target}"
site:gitbook.io "{target}"
site:readthedocs.io "{target}"

16.21 WHOIS / RDAP / Historical

WHOIS gives current registrant; RDAP is the structured replacement; historical WHOIS is the pivot gold.

Current WHOIS:

whois target.example                              # standard CLI
curl -sk -m 10 "https://www.whois.com/whois/"  # web fallback

RDAP (RFC 7480, structured JSON):

# IANA bootstrap → returns the registry RDAP server
curl -sk "https://rdap.org/domain/" | jq .
curl -sk "https://www.iana.org/rdap" | jq .   # bootstrap registry

What to extract from WHOIS / RDAP:

  • Registrant: name, org, email, phone, address (often redacted post-GDPR but not always for non-EU registrants).
  • Registrar: enables registrar-account pivot for related domains.
  • Created / updated / expiry dates: pattern of bulk registrations = same registrant.
  • Nameservers: NS reuse pivot.
  • Status flags (clientHold, clientTransferProhibited, etc.) = posture indicators.
  • Abuse contact: useful for responsible disclosure (§30).

Historical WHOIS:

Pre-GDPR records often have unredacted contact info. Sources:

Source Notes
DomainTools Paid; gold-standard; full WHOIS history.
WhoisXML API Paid; bulk + history.
SecurityTrails Paid; WHOIS + DNS history.
viewdns.info Free WHOIS history (limited).
whoisology.com Paid; reverse WHOIS by registrant email.

Reverse-WHOIS pivots:

If you have a registrant email, search "every domain registered by this email":

# DomainTools (paid)
curl -sk -H "X-API-Username: ..." -H "X-API-Key: ..." \
  "https://api.domaintools.com/v1/reverse-whois/?terms=admin@target.example"

This finds adjacent corporate assets (subsidiary domains, brand variations, employee personal projects on corp email).

16.22 DNS Record Catalog (TXT verification tokens, MX→IdP)

For every target domain, dump all common record types:

D="target.example"
for rtype in A AAAA MX TXT NS SOA CAA SRV CNAME PTR; do
  echo "===  ==="
  dig +short "" ""
done

TXT record verification token catalog (each token reveals a SaaS tenancy):

TXT pattern SaaS / service Implication
google-site-verification=<token> Google Workspace / Search Console / Analytics Google tenancy.
MS=ms<digits> Microsoft 365 (older) M365 tenancy.
apple-domain-verification=<token> Apple Business Manager / iCloud Calendar Apple ecosystem.
atlassian-domain-verification=<token> Atlassian Cloud (Jira/Confluence/etc.) Atlassian customer.
facebook-domain-verification=<token> Facebook Business / Pixel FB Business.
adobe-idp-site-verification=<token> Adobe Sign / Creative Cloud Adobe customer.
docusign=<token> DocuSign DocuSign customer.
dropbox-domain-verification=<token> Dropbox Business Dropbox customer.
box-verification=<token> Box Box customer.
webexdomainverification.<id> Webex Cisco Webex.
zoom_verify_<id> Zoom Zoom customer (admin domain).
notion=<token> (rare) Notion workspace Notion enterprise.
slack-domain-verification=<token> Slack Enterprise Grid Slack EG.
asana-domain-verification=<token> Asana Enterprise Asana customer.
mongodb-site-verification=<token> MongoDB Atlas DB tenant.
_dnsauth.<token> Many ACME / Let's Encrypt CAs DNS-01 challenge in progress.
pinterest-site-verification=<token> Pinterest Business Marketing surface.
cisco-ci-domain-verification=<token> Cisco Spark / Webex Cisco.
_globalsign-domain-verification=<token> GlobalSign cert authority Cert provider.
mailru-verification:<token> Mail.ru RU presence.
yandex-verification:<token> Yandex services RU presence.
zscaler-verification-<id>-<date>-<random> Zscaler (ZIA / ZPA / ZDX) Web SSE / SASE customer; the date suffix is the verification-issued date.
cloudflare-verify=<token> Cloudflare (Zero Trust / Access / WARP) Cloudflare org-tier customer.
autosect-site-verification=<token> AutoSect (security tooling) Security vendor on tenant.
cisco-site-verification=<token> Cisco (various products) Cisco vendor.
mscid=<token> Microsoft (newer M365 verification) M365 tenancy (newer format).
_amazonses=<token> AWS SES sender verification SES sender.
salesforce-domain-verification=<token> Salesforce SF customer.
workday-domain-verification=<token> Workday Workday customer (HR + Finance).
shopify-domain-verification=<token> Shopify E-commerce customer.
klaviyo-domain-verification=<token> Klaviyo Marketing automation.
mailchimp-domain-verification=<token> Mailchimp Marketing email.
hubspot-domain-verification=<token> HubSpot CRM / marketing.
zendesk-verification=<token> Zendesk Support tenancy (also see §43).
freshworks-verification=<token> Freshworks Support / CRM customer.
intercom-verification=<token> Intercom Messaging tenancy.
loom-site-verification=<token> Loom Video.
miro-site-verification=<token> Miro Whiteboard tenancy.
gitlab-domain-verification=<token> GitLab Self-hosted or cloud verification.

Each discovered tenancy is a separate attack surface (own credentials, own MFA posture, own data).

Autodiscover-as-confirmation pattern:

autodiscover.<domain> resolving to Microsoft IP space (40.96.0.0/13, 52.96.0.0/14, 13.107.0.0/16) is definitive proof of M365 Exchange Online tenancy — even when MX records are obscured by Mimecast/Proofpoint/Barracuda inbound filtering. Probe:

Resolve-DnsName "autodiscover." -Type A | Select Name,IPAddress

If IPs are in Microsoft ranges → M365_CONFIRMED. Cross-reference with getuserrealm.srf (§22.1) for tenant GUID extraction.

CAA records:

dig +short CAA ""

Lists which CAs are allowed to issue certs. Absence = LOW finding (any CA can mis-issue). Presence + restrictive list = good posture.

SOA serial pattern analysis:

dig +short SOA ""

Serial format YYYYMMDDNN reveals last-edit date. Pattern across multiple zones can correlate ownership.

16.23 Wayback CDX Deep Usage

The Wayback Machine has a structured query API.

Basic CDX query:

D="target.example"
curl -sk "https://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=/*&output=json&fl=timestamp,original&limit=10000"

Returns JSON array of [timestamp, original_url] tuples.

Useful filters:

  • &from=20200101&to=20231231 — date range.
  • &filter=mimetype:application/json — only JSON responses (often APIs).
  • &filter=mimetype:application/javascript — JS bundles.
  • &filter=statuscode:200 — only successful captures.
  • &filter=urlkey:.*api.* — only URLs containing "api".
  • &collapse=urlkey — dedup by URL.
  • &collapse=digest — dedup by content (catches identical pages re-archived).

Get specific snapshot:

TS="20231215120000"
URL="https://target.example/admin/dashboard"
curl -sk "https://web.archive.org/web//"

Diff snapshot vs live:

LIVE=$(curl -sk -m 10 "")
ARCHIVED=$(curl -sk -m 10 "https://web.archive.org/web//")
diff <(echo "") <(echo "") | head -100

Save current page:

curl -sk -X POST "https://pragma.archivelab.org/" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"url":"https://target.example/admin"}'

Find every archived JS:

curl -sk "https://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=/*.js&output=json&fl=timestamp,original&filter=statuscode:200" | \
  jq -r '.[1:][] | "\(.[0]) \(.[1])"'

For each, fetch the archived JS and run the secret catalog (§17). Old JS often had hard-coded keys later removed.

Legacy-app pivot (when *.js returns empty):

Static brochure-ware sites (older corporate sites, especially pre-2015) often have zero archived JS because the frontend was server-rendered. Pivot to legacy file extensions:

# ASP / ASP.NET classic
curl -sk "https://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=/*.asp&output=json&fl=timestamp,original&filter=statuscode:200&collapse=urlkey&limit=500"

# PHP
curl -sk "https://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=/*.php&output=json&fl=timestamp,original&filter=statuscode:200&collapse=urlkey&limit=500"

# JSP / .NET aspx / CGI / Coldfusion
for ext in aspx jsp cgi cfm; do
  echo "=== . ==="
  curl -sk "https://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=/*.&output=json&fl=timestamp,original&filter=statuscode:200&collapse=urlkey&limit=200"
done

# JSON / XML config (sometimes leaks endpoints + creds)
for ext in json xml yml yaml ini conf; do
  echo "=== . ==="
  curl -sk "https://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=/*.&output=json&fl=timestamp,original&filter=statuscode:200&collapse=urlkey&limit=100"
done

# Anything indexed (broad sweep — useful for legacy enumeration)
curl -sk "https://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=/*&output=json&fl=timestamp,original&filter=statuscode:200&collapse=urlkey&limit=10000"

Legacy .asp / .cfm / .jsp URLs often reveal: forgotten admin panels, old user-enum endpoints, legacy auth flows, SQL-injection-prone parameters. Cross-reference with current DNS — many legacy hosts now NXDOMAIN but the URL paths sometimes survive on a renamed host.

16.24 Common-Prefix Subdomain Sweep (active, low-detectability)

Empirically: passive cert-transparency enumeration (crt.sh / VirusTotal / Subfinder) misses 20–40% of high-value subdomains because (a) many internal hosts use wildcard certs that don't expose the FQDN, (b) some hosts have never been issued public certs (HTTP-only or self-signed), (c) very-recently-provisioned hosts haven't propagated to CT log mirrors yet.

Always pair passive enum with an active prefix-probe. Detectability: low (single A-record query per host; no port scan, no HTTP).

The high-yield prefix list (ordered by hit-rate from real engagements):

www, mail, webmail, smtp, imap, pop, owa, autodiscover, ftp, sftp,
vpn, sslvpn, gateway, gp, globalprotect, citrix, fortinet, anyconnect,
api, app, apps, mobile, m,
portal, login, sso, idp, iam, identity, accounts, oauth, auth, adfs,
admin, manage, console, dashboard, cp, cpanel,
intranet, internal, hr, payroll, finance, sap, erp, crm, helpdesk, servicedesk,
support, help, kb, status, monitoring, grafana, kibana, prometheus,
docs, wiki, confluence, jira, bitbucket, gitlab, jenkins, sonar, nexus,
git, svn, repo, code,
dev, test, staging, stg, qa, uat, sandbox, preprod, preview, demo,
careers, jobs, vacancies, recruit, eapps,
shop, store, ecommerce, checkout, payments, pay, billing,
old, legacy, archive, backup, beta, v1, v2, classic,
cdn, static, assets, media, img, files, downloads, public,
ns, ns1, ns2, dns, mx, mx1, mx2,
zoom, teams, slack, lync, sip, voice, meet,
sclepro, tender, tenders, suppliers, vendor, vendors, procurement, purchase

One-liner (PowerShell):

 = "target.example"
 = @("www","mail","webmail","owa","autodiscover","ftp","vpn","sslvpn","gateway","api","app","portal","login","sso","idp","iam","identity","accounts","oauth","auth","adfs","admin","intranet","hr","sap","erp","crm","support","help","status","grafana","kibana","docs","wiki","jira","jenkins","gitlab","dev","test","staging","stg","qa","uat","sandbox","preprod","preview","careers","jobs","eapps","old","legacy","beta","tender","suppliers","procurement")
foreach ( in ) {
   = Resolve-DnsName "." -Type A -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
  if () {
     = ( | ? {.IPAddress}).IPAddress -join ","
    ". -> "
  }
}

One-liner (bash + dig):

D="target.example"
for p in www mail webmail owa autodiscover ftp vpn sslvpn gateway api app portal login sso idp iam identity accounts oauth auth adfs admin intranet hr sap erp crm support help status grafana kibana docs wiki jira jenkins gitlab dev test staging stg qa uat sandbox preprod preview careers jobs eapps old legacy beta tender suppliers procurement; do
  IP=$(dig +short A "." | head -1)
  [ -n "" ] && echo ". -> "
done

Mass DNS approach (faster for large prefix lists):

# Generate candidate FQDNs from a wordlist; resolve in parallel via puredns
puredns resolve <(awk -v d="" '{print "."d}' assetnote-best-dns-wordlist.txt) -r resolvers.txt

What to extract from each hit:

  • IP / IP block → ASN lookup (§28.1) → confirms target-owned vs hosted-elsewhere.
  • For vpn.* / gateway.* / gp.* / globalprotect.* / citrix.* → flag for active vendor fingerprint (§16.16) under separate engagement scope.
  • For api.* / app.* → seed for §16.1–16.10 webapp probes.
  • For staging.* / dev.* / uat.* → seed for §16.5 always-on HTTP checks (often weaker auth + debug endpoints).
  • For intranet.* / eapps.* / sclepro.* → public-intranet finding (often MEDIUM; per §40).

Real-engagement validation: in an internal smoke test, prefix-sweep found vpn., api., intranet., staging., support., eapps., sclepro., autodiscover. — all of which crt.sh missed (or returned 502 for). Treat passive + active as complementary, not alternatives.

17. Secret-Pattern Catalog — 48 patterns (29 base + 19 modern)

The catalog runs against any text source: GitHub code, Postman workspaces, JS bodies, sourcesContent blobs, mobile-app strings, Wayback HTML, paste sites, Stack Exchange code blocks. Order matters: most-specific patterns first so generic catches don't pre-empt typed ones.

# Name Regex Severity Category
1 AWS Access Key \b(AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b CRITICAL aws
2 AWS Secret Key (typed) (?i)aws[_\-]?secret[_\-]?access[_\-]?key['"\s:=]+([A-Za-z0-9/+=]{40}) CRITICAL aws
3 AWS Secret (loose) (?i)aws(.{0,20})?(secret|sk)["'=: ]+([0-9a-z/+=]{40}) HIGH aws
4 GCP Service Account JSON "type"\s*:\s*"service_account" CRITICAL gcp
5 Google API Key \bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_\-]{35}\b HIGH gcp
6 GitHub Classic PAT \bghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b CRITICAL github
7 GitHub Fine-grained PAT \bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{82}\b CRITICAL github
8 GitHub OAuth \bgho_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b HIGH github
9 GitHub Server-to-Server \bgh[usr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}\b HIGH github
10 Stripe Live Key \bsk_live_[0-9A-Za-z]{24,}\b CRITICAL stripe
11 Stripe Test Key \bsk_test_[0-9A-Za-z]{24,}\b LOW stripe
12 Slack Token \bxox[abpors]-[0-9A-Za-z\-]{10,48}\b HIGH slack
13 Slack Webhook https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/T[A-Z0-9]+/B[A-Z0-9]+/[A-Za-z0-9]+ MEDIUM slack
14 SendGrid Key \bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{22}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{43}\b HIGH email_svc
15 Mailgun Key (v1) \bkey-[0-9a-zA-Z]{32}\b HIGH email_svc
16 Mailgun Key (loose) \bkey-[0-9a-f]{32}\b HIGH email_svc
17 Twilio API Key \bSK[0-9a-fA-F]{32}\b HIGH twilio
18 Twilio Account SID \bAC[a-f0-9]{32}\b MEDIUM twilio
19 Twilio Auth Token (?i)twilio(.{0,20})?(auth|token)["'=: ]+([a-f0-9]{32}) HIGH twilio
20 Heroku API Key (?i)heroku(.{0,20})?api["'=: ]+([0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}) MEDIUM paas
21 Firebase URL \bhttps?://[a-z0-9\-]+\.firebaseio\.com\b LOW firebase
22 JWT (any) \beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}\b MEDIUM jwt
23 Bearer Token Assignment (?i)authorization["'=: ]+bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._\-]{20,} MEDIUM bearer
24 Basic Auth in URL https?://[^/\s:@]+:[^/\s:@]+@[^/\s]+ MEDIUM basic_auth
25 RSA Private Key -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- CRITICAL private_key
26 EC Private Key -----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- CRITICAL private_key
27 OpenSSH Private Key -----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- CRITICAL private_key
28 Generic Private Key -----BEGIN (DSA |PGP |)PRIVATE KEY----- CRITICAL private_key
29 Generic API Key (?i)(?:api[_\-]?key|apikey|api_secret|access_token|secret[_\-]?token)['"\s:=]+["']([A-Za-z0-9+/=_\-]{24,})["'] MEDIUM generic
30 Anthropic API Key \bsk-ant-(?:api03|admin01)-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{93,}\b CRITICAL ai_api
31 OpenAI API Key (legacy) \bsk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20}T3BlbkFJ[A-Za-z0-9]{20}\b CRITICAL ai_api
32 OpenAI Project Key \bsk-proj-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{40,}T3BlbkFJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{40,}\b CRITICAL ai_api
33 OpenAI User Session \bsess-[A-Za-z0-9]{40}\b HIGH ai_api
34 HuggingFace Token \bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b HIGH ai_api
35 Cloudflare API Token \b[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{40}\b (when paired with (?i)cloudflare/X-Auth-Key context) HIGH infra_api
36 Cloudflare Global API Key (?i)cf[_\-]?api[_\-]?key['"\s:=]+([a-f0-9]{37}) CRITICAL infra_api
37 DigitalOcean Token \bdop_v1_[a-f0-9]{64}\b HIGH infra_api
38 npm Token (Modern) \bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b HIGH package_registry
39 PyPI Token \bpypi-AgENdGV[A-Za-z0-9_\-]+\b HIGH package_registry
40 Docker Hub PAT \bdckr_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{27,}\b HIGH package_registry
41 Atlassian API Token \bATATT3xFfGF0[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{180,}\b HIGH saas_api
42 New Relic License Key \b(?:NRAA|NRAK|NRBR)-[A-F0-9]{27}\b MEDIUM observability
43 DataDog API Key (in DD_API_KEY context) (?i)dd[_\-]?api[_\-]?key['"\s:=]+([a-f0-9]{32}) HIGH observability
44 Sentry DSN https://[a-f0-9]+@o[0-9]+\.ingest\.sentry\.io/[0-9]+ LOW observability
45 ngrok Auth Token \b[12][A-Za-z0-9]{26}_[A-Za-z0-9]{32,}\b (when (?i)ngrok context) MEDIUM tunneling
46 Linear API Key \blin_api_[A-Za-z0-9]{40}\b MEDIUM saas_api
47 Discord Bot Token \b[MN][A-Za-z\d]{23}\.[\w\-]{6}\.[\w\-]{27}\b HIGH bot_token
48 Telegram Bot Token \b\d{8,10}:[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{35}\b HIGH bot_token

False-positive notes:

  • Patterns 22 (JWT), 23 (Bearer), 29 (Generic) trigger on test/example data frequently. Always look at context — a JWT in a README.md example block ≠ a JWT in a production .env file.
  • Pattern 16 (Mailgun loose) and pattern 11 (Stripe test) are noisy by design; severity is set low for that reason.
  • Pattern 24 (Basic auth in URL) catches monitoring-tool URLs and CI-debug URLs as well as real creds — verify before alerting.
  • For GitHub's Fine-grained PAT (pattern 7), the 82 length is by GitHub's spec — be skeptical of matches significantly longer or shorter.

18. Dork Corpus — 80+ templates, 9 categories

Substitute {domain} with the target domain (e.g., example.com) and {company} with the company name (e.g., Acme Corporation). Run via Google, Bing, Brave, DuckDuckGo, Yandex, Baidu — engines surface different results.

18.1 Files

site:{domain} filetype:env
site:{domain} ext:env OR ext:ini OR ext:cfg OR ext:conf
site:{domain} ext:sql OR ext:sqlite OR ext:dump OR ext:bak
site:{domain} ext:pem OR ext:key OR ext:p12 OR ext:pfx
site:{domain} ext:log
site:{domain} intitle:"index of"
site:{domain} inurl:.git OR inurl:/.git/
site:{domain} inurl:backup OR inurl:.bak OR inurl:old
site:{domain} ext:yml OR ext:yaml
site:{domain} ext:properties

18.2 Admin / login panels

site:{domain} inurl:admin OR inurl:login OR inurl:sso OR inurl:dashboard
site:{domain} intitle:"phpMyAdmin"
site:{domain} intitle:"Jenkins"
site:{domain} intitle:"Grafana"
site:{domain} intitle:"Kibana"
site:{domain} intitle:"Splunk"
site:{domain} (intitle:"login" OR intitle:"sign in")
site:{domain} intitle:"GitLab"
site:{domain} intitle:"Swagger" OR intitle:"OpenAPI"
site:{domain} inurl:phpinfo

18.3 Secrets / credential leakage

"{domain}" ("api_key" OR "apikey" OR "access_token")
"{domain}" (password OR passwd OR pwd)
site:pastebin.com "{domain}"
site:ghostbin.com "{domain}"
site:rentry.co "{domain}"
site:gist.github.com "{domain}"
site:hastebin.com "{domain}"
"{domain}" "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY"

18.4 Cloud / CI / shadow-IT

site:s3.amazonaws.com "{domain}"
site:storage.googleapis.com "{domain}"
site:blob.core.windows.net "{domain}"
site:digitaloceanspaces.com "{domain}"
site:trello.com "{domain}"
site:*.atlassian.net "{domain}"
site:dev.azure.com "{domain}"
site:bitbucket.org "{domain}"
site:firebaseio.com "{domain}"
site:herokuapp.com "{domain}"

18.5 Docs / intel mining

site:{domain} filetype:pdf (confidential OR internal OR restricted)
site:{domain} filetype:xlsx OR filetype:csv
site:{domain} filetype:docx
site:scribd.com "{company}"
"{company}" filetype:pdf (salary OR payroll OR org-chart OR "organization chart")
site:linkedin.com/in "{company}"
site:slideshare.net "{company}"

18.6 Vuln indicators

site:{domain} intext:"sql syntax" OR intext:"you have an error in your sql"
site:{domain} intext:"Warning: mysql_"
site:{domain} intext:"Fatal error:" intext:"on line"
site:{domain} intext:"stack trace" OR intext:"Traceback (most recent call last)"
"Apache/2.4.49" site:{domain}
"Server: nginx/1.14" site:{domain}
site:{domain} inurl:wp-content OR inurl:wp-includes

18.7 Internal tool exposure

site:{domain} intitle:"Splunk"
site:{domain} intitle:"Grafana"
site:{domain} intitle:"Kibana"
site:{domain} intitle:"Prometheus Time Series"
site:{domain} intitle:"Jaeger UI"
site:{domain} intitle:"AlertManager"
site:{domain} intitle:"Argo CD"
site:{domain} intitle:"Sonarqube"
site:{domain} intitle:"Sentry"
site:{domain} intitle:"Confluence"
site:{domain} intitle:"Jira"
site:{domain} intitle:"GitLab"
site:{domain} intitle:"Gitea"
site:{domain} intitle:"Drone CI"
site:{domain} inurl:"/jenkins/"

18.8 Backup / dump file extensions

site:{domain} ext:bak OR ext:backup OR ext:old OR ext:orig OR ext:save OR ext:swp
site:{domain} ext:tar OR ext:tar.gz OR ext:tgz OR ext:zip OR ext:rar OR ext:7z
site:{domain} ext:db OR ext:sqlite OR ext:sqlite3 OR ext:mdb
site:{domain} ext:dump OR ext:rdb OR ext:bson
site:{domain} (intext:"-- MySQL dump" OR intext:"PostgreSQL database dump")
site:{domain} ext:pcap OR ext:pcapng OR ext:cap
site:{domain} ext:core OR ext:hprof OR ext:dmp

18.9 Sector-specific (healthcare / finance / gov)

# Healthcare
site:{domain} (filetype:pdf OR filetype:xlsx) (HIPAA OR PHI OR "patient records")
site:{domain} ("DICOM" OR "HL7" OR "ICD-10")

# Finance
site:{domain} (filetype:pdf OR filetype:xlsx) (SOC OR "audit report" OR "internal control")
site:{domain} (filetype:pdf OR filetype:xlsx) ("Form 10-K" OR "Form 10-Q" OR earnings)
site:{domain} ("SWIFT" OR "BIC" OR IBAN OR "wire transfer")

# Gov / public sector
site:{domain} (filetype:pdf OR filetype:doc) (FOUO OR "controlled unclassified" OR CUI)
site:{domain} (filetype:pdf OR filetype:xlsx) ("personnel security" OR clearance)

18.10 Result classification

After running, score each result via URL signature → title hint → snippet regex:

  • CRITICAL URL signatures: .pem, .p12, .pfx, .key extensions; id_rsa filename.
  • HIGH URL signatures: /.env, /.git/, database dumps, wp-config.bak, /phpmyadmin, /jenkins, /phpinfo.php.
  • MEDIUM URL signatures: /admin, /login, /swagger, .log, /backup, .DS_Store.
  • Snippet content (e.g., a secret regex hit in the snippet) overrides URL signature only if higher severity.
  • Confidence: snippet-only match = TENTATIVE (operator must visit URL to confirm; tag detectability=medium).

19. GitHub Code-Search Dorks for Targets — 13 dorks

Apply each template to {target} (root domain stem like acme), {domain} (full root domain like acme.com), and optionally {company} (Acme Corporation):

"{target}" filename:.env
"{target}" filename:.env.example
"{target}" filename:config
"{target}" AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID
"{target}" AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY
"{target}" password
"{target}" api_key
"{target}" secret
"{target}" authorization: Bearer
"{target}" filename:id_rsa
"{target}" filename:.git-credentials
"{target}" filename:wp-config.php
"@{domain}" password                        # emails + password context

Requirements: GitHub personal access token (any scope; recommend a fine-grained PAT with read-only repo access). Rate limit per token; concurrency cap ≤5.

For each result:

  1. Fetch the file (or relevant fragment) via the GitHub Contents API.
  2. Run the secret catalog (§17).
  3. If a secret hits → SECRET_LEAK finding with catalog severity, evidence = repo URL + file path + matched secret (truncated, last 4 chars only).
  4. Optional: clone the repo to a tempdir, run trufflehog/gitleaks for full history scan.

20. Endpoint Interest Score — 0–100 rubric

For every classified endpoint (§22 in methodology skill), apply this rubric:

Signal Points Conditions
Unauth write +40 POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH endpoint returns 200/201/202/204 anonymously.
Open GraphQL introspection +35 __schema query returns full type list anonymously.
Verb tampering bypass +30 OPTIONS reveals method not documented; that method is accessible.
Reflected CORS + credentials +25 Access-Control-Allow-Origin reflects request Origin AND Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true.
Sensitive keyword in path +20 Path matches one of: admin, internal, debug, user, password, token, key, export, upload, backup, config, secret, private, delete, purge, wipe.
Schema leak in error +20 Response body contains stack trace, ORM error class, framework signature (e.g., ActiveRecord::RecordNotFound, org.hibernate.exception.*, django.db.utils.IntegrityError).
API key in URL +15 Path or query string contains api_key=, apikey=, token=, access_token=.
Wildcard CORS +10 Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *.
Missing rate-limit headers +10 No RateLimit-* / X-RateLimit-* headers; no Retry-After after rapid requests.

Thresholds:

Score Severity
≥ 90 CRITICAL
70–89 HIGH
50–69 MEDIUM
25–49 LOW
< 25 INFO

For score ≥ 70, attach an attack_path_hint in evidence (see §29).

21. Mobile App Ownership Confidence — 0–100 rubric

Before running deep APK static analysis, score whether the discovered app actually belongs to the target. Threshold: ≥70 = accept.

Signal Points
Package reverse-DNS matches target domain (e.g., com.acme.android ⟂ acme.com) +40
Developer email is <anything>@<target-domain> +25
Developer website URL is the target domain (or a confirmed sibling brand domain) +20
App name contains a brand keyword from operator-supplied brand list +10
App has ≥ minimum review-score threshold (default 20 reviews) +5

Apps below threshold are tagged mobile_review_pending and shown but not analyzed. Operator can re-score with --mobile-ownership-threshold 50 for noisier collection.

22. Identity Fabric — Concrete Endpoints

Methodology lives in the companion osint-methodology skill §11. This is the URL/payload reference.

22.1 Microsoft Entra (Azure AD)

OIDC metadata + tenant GUID extraction:

GET https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant-or-domain}/.well-known/openid-configuration

Response field issuer contains the tenant GUID. GUID regex:

\b[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}\b

Detectability: low.

getuserrealm.srf — managed vs federated probe:

GET https://login.microsoftonline.com/getuserrealm.srf?login=<probe-user>@<domain>

Response: JSON with NameSpaceType field (Managed / Federated / Unknown). Federated also includes FederationBrandName and AuthURL (the upstream IdP URL). Detectability: low.

Autodiscover v2:

POST https://autodiscover-s.outlook.com/autodiscover/metadata/json/1
Body: {"Email": "<probe-user>@<domain>"}

Returns the protocol endpoint for the user; presence indicates tenant membership. Detectability: low.

Autodiscover IP correlation (passive M365 confirmation):

Resolve autodiscover.<domain> and check if it lands in Microsoft Exchange Online IP space. This works even when MX is wrapped by Mimecast/Proofpoint/Barracuda inbound filtering, where MX alone doesn't reveal the underlying mail platform.

dig +short A autodiscover.target.example

Resolve-DnsName "autodiscover." -Type A | Select Name,IPAddress

Microsoft Exchange Online IPs (truncated common ranges): 40.96.0.0/13, 52.96.0.0/14, 13.107.6.152/31, 13.107.18.10/31, 40.99.0.0/16, 40.104.0.0/15, 52.98.0.0/15. Full list: Office 365 URLs and IP address ranges.

If autodiscover.<domain> lands in that space → M365_CONFIRMED even when nothing else does. Detectability: low (passive DNS).

GetCredentialType — user-enum (deep mode only):

POST https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/GetCredentialType
Content-Type: application/json
Body:
{
  "username": "<email>",
  "isOtherIdpSupported": true,
  "checkPhones": false,
  "isRemoteNGCSupported": true,
  "isCookieBannerShown": false,
  "isFidoSupported": true,
  "originalRequest": "",
  "country": "US",
  "forceotclogin": false,
  "isExternalFederationDisallowed": false,
  "isRemoteConnectSupported": false,
  "federationFlags": 0
}

Response field IfExistsResult indicates user existence: 0 = exists, 1 = doesn't exist, 5 = exists in federated tenant. Detectability: medium (logged in tenant audit). Cap at 20 attempts per tenant.

22.2 Okta

Org slug derivation: start with stems from discovered subdomains and root-domain stem. Probe <slug>.okta.com and <slug>.oktapreview.com. Slug regex:

[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,40}\.okta(?:preview)?\.com

OIDC fingerprint:

GET https://<slug>.okta.com/.well-known/openid-configuration

/api/v1/authn user-enum (deep mode):

POST https://<slug>.okta.com/api/v1/authn
Content-Type: application/json
Body: {"username": "<email>", "password": "invalid_password_for_enum"}

Response distinguishes user existence:

  • 400 with errorCode: E0000004 → user doesn't exist (or generic password error in some configs).
  • 401 with status: PASSWORD_WARN / LOCKED_OUT / MFA_REQUIRED → user exists.
    Detectability: medium (audit-log per attempt). Cap at 20 attempts per tenant.

22.3 ADFS

Passive fingerprint:

GET https://{domain}/adfs/idpinitiatedsignon.aspx

A 200 OK with a urn:com:microsoft:ADFS: reference in HTML indicates ADFS. Version-string greppable in HTML resource references.

Mex endpoint (deep mode):

GET https://{domain}/adfs/Services/Trust/mex

Returns SOAP federation metadata including endpoint URLs, signing certs, and supported claim types.

22.4 Google Workspace

OIDC discovery:

GET https://{domain}/.well-known/openid-configuration

Google-Workspace-hosted-domain customers expose discovery endpoints with characteristic issuer URI (https://accounts.google.com) and JWKS URI. MX records pointing to aspmx.l.google.com are a corroborating signal.

22.5 Generic OIDC (Keycloak / Auth0 / Ping / OneLogin / Duo)

Discovery: probe /.well-known/openid-configuration on every alive subdomain. The issuer and authorization_endpoint field URLs fingerprint the product:

Product URL pattern in issuer
Auth0 https://*.auth0.com
OneLogin https://*.onelogin.com
Ping https://*.pingone.com, https://*.pingidentity.com
Duo https://*.duosecurity.com
Keycloak URL contains /realms/<realm>
OneLogin https://*.onelogin.com

22.6 SAML metadata

See §16.6.

22.7 AWS account-ID extraction

S3 bucket region header (passive):

HEAD https://<known-bucket>.s3.amazonaws.com/

Response includes x-amz-bucket-region. Cross-reference with bucket name entropy and known patterns to scope the account.

ARN regex (in any JSON / HTML / JS response):

arn:aws:[a-z0-9\-]+:[a-z0-9\-]*:([0-9]{12}):

Capture group: 12-digit AWS account ID.

AccountId property pattern:

(?i)["']?account[_\-]?id["']?\s*[:=]\s*["']([0-9]{12})["']

Google OAuth client_id:

\b\d{8,}-[a-z0-9]{10,40}\.apps\.googleusercontent\.com\b

MSAL / Microsoft client_id (GUID property):

(?i)["']?client[_\-]?id["']?\s*[:=]\s*["']([0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12})["']

OAuth scope extraction:

(?i)["']?scope["']?\s*[:=]\s*["']([^"']+)["']

22.8 Microsoft 365 Deep Enumeration (Teams / SharePoint / OneDrive / OAuth)

Teams federation status:

# Resolve tenant first
curl -sk -m 10 "https://login.microsoftonline.com//.well-known/openid-configuration" | jq -r '.issuer'
# Federation API requires authenticated request from a federated tenant; presence of error pattern reveals fed status
curl -sk -m 10 "https://teams.microsoft.com/api/mt/emea/beta/users/<email>/externalsearchv3"

SharePoint subdomain probe:

STEM=$(echo  | cut -d. -f1)
for sub in "" "-my" "-admin"; do
  echo "=== .sharepoint.com ==="
  curl -sk -m 10 -I "https://.sharepoint.com/" -w '%{http_code}\n'
done

Reading the result correctly: HTTP 200 from these probes means the tenant exists (Microsoft serves a generic redirect-to-auth page) — it does NOT mean anonymous access is granted to the tenant's content. Distinguish:

  • 200 → tenant provisioned (INFO).
  • 200 + redirect to a custom anonymous-share URL (/sites/<x>/Lists/<y>/AllItems.aspx?guestaccesstoken=...) discovered via dorks → HIGH (data exposure).
  • 401/403 → tenant exists but auth required (INFO).
  • 404 / NXDOMAIN → tenant not provisioned at this stem (or vanity-named — check known stems from cert transparency).

PowerShell:

 = ( -split '\.')[0]
foreach ( in @("","-my","-admin")) {
  try {
     = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://.sharepoint.com/" -Method Head -UseBasicParsing -TimeoutSec 10
    ".sharepoint.com -> HTTP $(.StatusCode) (tenant exists)"
  } catch {
     = .Exception.Response.StatusCode.value__
    if () { ".sharepoint.com -> HTTP " } else { ".sharepoint.com -> no host" }
  }
}

OneDrive personal site probe (for a known email alice@acme.com):

USER_TOKEN=$(echo "alice@acme.com" | tr '@.' '__')
STEM="acme"
curl -sk -m 10 -I "https://-my.sharepoint.com/personal//Documents/" -w '%{http_code}\n'
# 401 = exists; 404 = not provisioned

M365 OAuth client_id discovery in JS:

curl -sk -m 10 "https://app.target.example/main.js" | \
  grep -oE 'clientId["'\''[:=]+ ?["'\'']?[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}'

Device-code phishing target check (look for device_authorization_endpoint in OIDC metadata):

curl -sk -m 10 "https://login.microsoftonline.com//v2.0/.well-known/openid-configuration" | \
  jq '.device_authorization_endpoint'

If non-null and tenant doesn't restrict device-code: MEDIUM finding (device-code phishing feasible).

Power Platform / Dynamics URLs to check:

  • *.crm.dynamics.com (per-region: crm, crm2-crm15, crm.dynamics.com).
  • *.api.crm.dynamics.com (Web API).
  • make.powerapps.com / flow.microsoft.com (auth-required dashboards).

Severity:

  • Discovered SharePoint/OneDrive tenants → INFO (asset only).
  • Anonymous SharePoint anonymous-share link → HIGH (data exposure).
  • device_authorization_endpoint enabled on tenant → MEDIUM (operational risk).
  • Multi-tenant OAuth app with broad Graph scopes published by target → HIGH.

22.9 GraphQL Field-Suggestion Enumeration (when introspection disabled)

When the standard introspection query (§16.2) returns "errors":[{"message":"GraphQL introspection is disabled"}], fall back to field-suggestion enumeration. Apollo and most GraphQL libraries enable "did you mean" suggestions by default.

Detection probe:

curl -sk -m 10 -X POST "/graphql" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"query":"{ __schema { types { name } } }"}' | jq -r '.errors[0].message'
# If "introspection disabled" → proceed.

Field-suggestion probe (intentionally typo a field name to trigger suggestions):

curl -sk -m 10 -X POST "/graphql" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"query":"{ usre { id } }"}' | jq -r '.errors[].message'
# Expected: "Cannot query field \"usre\" on type \"Query\". Did you mean \"user\", \"users\", \"userById\"?"

Iterate over a candidate-field wordlist (use SecLists Discovery/Web-Content/graphql.txt or clairvoyance library's seed list). Each suggestion reveals real field names. Continue until no new suggestions emerge.

Tooling:

  • Clairvoyance (pip install clairvoyance) — automated field-suggestion enumerator. clairvoyance -w wordlist.txt -o schema.json https://target.example/graphql.
  • GraphQL-Cop — auditor that probes for introspection, batching, depth-limit, suggestion config. pip install graphql-cop.
  • InQL (Burp extension) — Burp Suite extension for GraphQL endpoint analysis.
  • GraphQL Voyager — visualize once schema is reconstructed.

Other GraphQL-when-introspection-disabled techniques:

  • Alias-based query batching (rate-limit / auth-bypass surface):

    {
  "query": "{ a:user(id:1){name} b:user(id:2){name} c:user(id:3){name} ... }"
}

    Many APIs rate-limit per-request, not per-alias. Test 100+ aliases per request.

  • Query-depth-limit bypass (DoS / introspection bypass):

    {
  "query": "{ user { friends { friends { friends { friends { id } } } } } }"
}

    If server allows arbitrary depth → DoS surface; if depth-limited but doesn't strip nested __type/__schema → introspection-via-depth.

  • Subscription enumeration via WebSocket:

    wscat -c "wss://target.example/graphql" -s graphql-ws
> {"type":"connection_init"}
> {"id":"1","type":"start","payload":{"query":"subscription { __schema { types { name } } }"}}

  • Batched query bypass (some servers process all queries in batch even if first fails):

    [
  {"query":"{ __schema { types { name } } }"},
  {"query":"{ user(id:1) { name } }"}
]

Severity:

  • Field-suggestion enumeration succeeds (50+ fields recoverable) → MEDIUM MISCONFIG.
  • Alias batching not rate-limited → MEDIUM (rate-limit-bypass surface).
  • Subscription endpoint exposed without auth → MEDIUM (often used for real-time data exfil).

23. Read-Only Secret Validators

Use these to confirm a discovered credential is live. Read-only, never destructive. Tag every validation with detectability and checked_at (UTC).

23.1 Postman API Key (PMAK-*)

GET https://api.getpostman.com/me
Header: X-Api-Key: PMAK-<key>
  • 200 → live; response contains {user: {id, username, email}}.
  • 401 → dead.
  • Scope: full read access to the user's Postman account (collections, env vars, history).
  • Detectability: low.

23.2 AWS Access Key

sts:GetCallerIdentity

Use boto3:

import boto3
sts = boto3.client('sts',
    aws_access_key_id='<AKIA...>',
    aws_secret_access_key='<secret>',
    region_name='us-east-1')
ident = sts.get_caller_identity()
# ident['Account'], ident['Arn'], ident['UserId']
  • Valid → returns Account ID + ARN + UserId.
  • Invalid → InvalidClientTokenId or SignatureDoesNotMatch.
  • ARN scope: :user/ is IAM user (broad), :assumed-role/ is temp role (narrow), :root is account root (do NOT validate root keys you find).
  • Detectability: medium (CloudTrail logs GetCallerIdentity in account <found>).

23.3 GitHub PAT

GET https://api.github.com/user
Header: Authorization: token <ghp_*>
  • 200 → live; response contains login, id, name, email (if public).
  • Response header X-OAuth-Scopes lists token scopes. repo scope = write to all accessible repos; admin:org = org admin.
  • 401 → dead.
  • Detectability: low.

23.4 Slack Token

POST https://slack.com/api/auth.test
Header: Authorization: Bearer <xox*-*>
  • 200 with {"ok": true} → live; response includes team, team_id, user, user_id.
  • 200 with {"ok": false, "error": "invalid_auth"} → dead.
  • Detectability: low.

23.5 Anthropic API Key

GET https://api.anthropic.com/v1/models
Headers:
  x-api-key: sk-ant-api03-...
  anthropic-version: 2023-06-01
  • 200 → live; response lists available models.
  • 401 → dead.
  • 403 with org_disabled → key valid but org disabled.
  • Detectability: low; usage shows in Anthropic Console for the workspace owner.

23.6 OpenAI API Key

GET https://api.openai.com/v1/models
Header: Authorization: Bearer sk-...
  • 200 → live; lists models (may include org-specific fine-tunes).
  • 401 → dead.
  • 429 → live but quota exhausted.
  • Detectability: low; usage shows in OpenAI dashboard.

23.7 npm Token

GET https://registry.npmjs.org/-/whoami
Header: Authorization: Bearer npm_<token>
  • 200 with {"username": "<user>"} → live.
  • 401 → dead.
  • For scope check: GET /-/npm/v1/tokens returns the token's permissions (read/publish).
  • Detectability: low.

23.8 Atlassian API Token

GET https://<workspace>.atlassian.net/rest/api/3/myself
Auth: Basic <base64(email:ATATT3xFfGF0_...)>
  • 200 → live; returns account profile + email.
  • 401 → dead.
  • Workspace required — extract from leaked repo URL or Atlassian dork results.
  • Detectability: low.

23.9 DataDog API + APP Key

GET https://api.datadoghq.com/api/v1/validate
Headers:
  DD-API-KEY: <api-key>
  DD-APPLICATION-KEY: <app-key>
  • 200 → both keys valid.
  • 403 → either key invalid.
  • Per-region URL varies: api.datadoghq.eu, api.us3.datadoghq.com, etc.
  • Detectability: low; appears in DataDog audit log.

23.10 Validator output schema

{
  "status":          "verified_live" | "verified_dead" | "scope_restricted" |
                     "scope_unrestricted" | "validation_skipped_by_policy" |
                     "validation_unsupported" | "validation_failed_transient",
  "provider":        "postman" | "aws" | "github" | "slack" | "anthropic" | "openai" | "npm" | "atlassian" | "datadog",
  "account_id":      "<opaque>",
  "scope":           "<freeform>",
  "metadata":        {<provider-specific>},
  "checked_at":      "<UTC ISO8601>",
  "detectability":   "low" | "medium" | "high"
}

23.11 Hard rules

  • Read-only endpoint only.
  • Never use the validated credential to create, modify, delete, or send anything.
  • Tag every validation with detectability.
  • Record checked_at (UTC).
  • If RoE forbids validation → validation_skipped_by_policy, stop, document.
  • For root AWS keys, infrastructure-write GitHub PATs, or admin Slack tokens — flag for the operator and let them decide.

23.12 Post-Discovery Enumeration Workflows

After validation confirms a key is live, you often want to enumerate what it can do. Stay read-only.

AWS access key — IAM enum:

export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="AKIA..."
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="..."

# Identity (already done as part of validation)
aws sts get-caller-identity

# IAM-user details (only if ARN was :user/)
aws iam get-user
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name $(aws iam get-user --query 'User.UserName' --output text)
aws iam list-user-policies --user-name $(aws iam get-user --query 'User.UserName' --output text)
aws iam list-groups-for-user --user-name $(aws iam get-user --query 'User.UserName' --output text)

# What can I actually do? (simulate-principal-policy for common dangerous actions)
aws iam simulate-principal-policy \
  --policy-source-arn $(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Arn --output text) \
  --action-names s3:ListAllMyBuckets ec2:DescribeInstances iam:ListUsers \
                 secretsmanager:ListSecrets ssm:DescribeParameters \
                 lambda:ListFunctions rds:DescribeDBInstances

# Read-only enumeration of common services (do not WRITE)
aws s3 ls
aws ec2 describe-instances --output table --query 'Reservations[*].Instances[*].[InstanceId,State.Name,Tags[?Key==`Name`].Value]'
aws secretsmanager list-secrets --query 'SecretList[*].Name'
aws ssm describe-parameters --query 'Parameters[*].Name'
aws lambda list-functions --query 'Functions[*].FunctionName'
aws rds describe-db-instances --query 'DBInstances[*].DBInstanceIdentifier'

# CloudTrail check — is logging on?
aws cloudtrail describe-trails

# Check MFA enforcement on the user
aws iam get-account-summary | jq '.SummaryMap.AccountMFAEnabled'
aws iam list-mfa-devices --user-name <username>

GitHub PAT — repo enum:

TOKEN="ghp_..."
H="Authorization: token "

# Scopes already captured from X-OAuth-Scopes header
curl -sk -m 10 -I -H "" https://api.github.com/user | grep -i 'X-OAuth-Scopes'

# All repos accessible (own + collaborator + org member)
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" "https://api.github.com/user/repos?affiliation=owner,collaborator,organization_member&per_page=100"

# Org memberships
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" "https://api.github.com/user/orgs"

# Per-org: members, repos, secrets (secrets endpoint is metadata-only — names not values)
ORG="<orgname>"
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" "https://api.github.com/orgs//members"
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" "https://api.github.com/orgs//repos?per_page=100"
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" "https://api.github.com/orgs//actions/secrets"   # requires admin:org

# Per-repo workflow secrets (metadata)
REPO="<orgname/reponame>"
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" "https://api.github.com/repos//actions/secrets"

Slack token — workspace enum:

TOKEN="xoxb-..."
H="Authorization: Bearer "

# auth.test already validated
# Identity details
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" -X POST "https://slack.com/api/users.identity" | jq .

# What conversations can I see? (sweeping check; respects scope)
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" -X POST "https://slack.com/api/conversations.list?types=public_channel,private_channel,mpim,im&limit=200" | jq '.channels[] | {id, name, is_private}'

# Workspace info
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" -X POST "https://slack.com/api/team.info" | jq .

# User list (only if scope includes users:read)
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" -X POST "https://slack.com/api/users.list?limit=100" | jq '.members[] | {name, real_name, is_admin}'

# DO NOT: chat.postMessage, files.upload, conversations.invite, etc.

JWT — full triage workflow:

JWT="eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiI..."

# Decode header
echo "" | cut -d. -f1 | base64 -d 2>/dev/null | jq .
# Look for: alg (none = critical, HS256/HS384/HS512 = symmetric, RS256/RS512 = asymmetric, ES256 = ECDSA)
# Look for: kid (key ID — possible JKU/X5U injection target)
# Look for: jku, x5u (JKU/X5U values — control these = sign attacker JWTs)

# Decode payload
echo "" | cut -d. -f2 | base64 -d 2>/dev/null | jq .
# Look for: exp (expired = downgraded), iat, nbf
# Look for: sub, iss, aud (identity disclosure)
# Look for: roles, scopes, permissions (privilege markers)
# Look for: sensitive claims (email, employee ID, SSN, etc.)

# Algorithm-confusion test (RS→HS)
# If alg is RS256, try crafting an HS256 token signed with the public key as secret
# Tools: jwt_tool, jwt-cracker

# Brute-force HS256 secret (if HS256 + short-secret suspicion)
hashcat -m 16500 "" /path/to/wordlist.txt
# Or: john --format=HMAC-SHA256 jwt-hash.txt --wordlist=...

# Check `none` algorithm bypass
# Re-encode header with alg=none and empty signature; some libraries accept
NEW_JWT=$(echo -n '{"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"}' | base64 -w0 | tr -d '=' | tr '/+' '_-')
NEW_JWT=".$(echo "" | cut -d. -f2)."
# Test against API

Postman PMAK — workspace enum:

PMAK="PMAK-..."
H="X-Api-Key: "

# /me already done (validation)
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" https://api.getpostman.com/me | jq '.user'

# Workspaces
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" https://api.getpostman.com/workspaces | jq '.workspaces[] | {id, name, type}'

# Per-workspace collections
WS="<workspace-id>"
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" "https://api.getpostman.com/workspaces/" | jq '.workspace.collections[]'
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" "https://api.getpostman.com/workspaces/" | jq '.workspace.environments[]'

# Per-collection requests (where the secrets often live)
COL="<collection-id>"
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" "https://api.getpostman.com/collections/" | jq '.collection.item[]'
# Run secret catalog over the JSON

# Environments (env vars often contain creds)
ENV="<environment-id>"
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" "https://api.getpostman.com/environments/" | jq '.environment.values[] | {key, value}'

Anthropic API key — usage enum:

KEY="sk-ant-api03-..."
H="x-api-key: "
A="anthropic-version: 2023-06-01"

# Models accessible
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" -H "" https://api.anthropic.com/v1/models | jq '.data[] | .id'

# Usage / quota (admin-scoped tokens only):
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" -H "" https://api.anthropic.com/v1/organizations/usage_report | jq .

# DO NOT: send actual completion requests against organization budget

OpenAI API key — usage enum:

KEY="sk-..."
H="Authorization: Bearer "

# Models
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" https://api.openai.com/v1/models | jq '.data | length'

# Org info (if key has org scope)
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" https://api.openai.com/v1/organizations | jq .

# Files / fine-tunes (sometimes contain training data with PII)
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" https://api.openai.com/v1/files | jq .
curl -sk -m 10 -H "" https://api.openai.com/v1/fine_tuning/jobs | jq .

Generic key — provenance enum:

  1. Find the consuming domain (where in JS bundle did the key appear? what URL is the bundle served from?).
  2. Check the API docs of the inferred service.
  3. If the key matches a known regex, lookup vendor-specific scope check.
  4. If unknown service, search GitHub for the key prefix (gh search code "<prefix>" --type=code).
  5. Identify scope before validating; some keys are write-broad on first use.

Postman's public-search endpoint is unauthenticated and indexes every workspace marked public.

Verified endpoint shape (mid-2025 onward):

curl -sk -m 15 \
  "https://www.postman.com/_api/ws/proxy" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'X-Entity-Team-Id: 0' \
  -d '{
    "service":"search",
    "method":"POST",
    "path":"/search-all",
    "body":{
      "queryIndices":["collaboration.workspace","runtime.collection","runtime.request"],
      "queryText":"acme.com",
      "size":100,
      "from":0,
      "clientTraceId":"",
      "queryAllIndices":false,
      "domain":"public"
    }
  }' | jq '.data[]'

This proxies through Postman's web app to their internal search service. Pagination via from (0, 100, 200, ...).

If the proxy shape changes (it has historically): inspect a real search request from the Postman web UI:

  1. Open https://www.postman.com/explore in a browser.
  2. Open DevTools → Network tab.
  3. Search for any term.
  4. Find the request to _api/... — copy as cURL — adapt.

Per-workspace walk:

For each matching workspace ID:

WS_ID="<workspace-id>"
# Workspace metadata (name, description, team, visibility)
curl -sk -m 10 "https://www.postman.com/_api/workspace/" | jq .

# List collections + environments + monitors in workspace
curl -sk -m 10 "https://www.postman.com/_api/workspace//collection" | jq '.[].id'
curl -sk -m 10 "https://www.postman.com/_api/workspace//environment" | jq '.[].id'

# Per-collection: full content (requests, headers, scripts, env vars)
COL_ID="<collection-id>"
curl -sk -m 10 "https://www.postman.com/_api/collection/" | jq '.collection.item[]'

Ownership scoring signals:

  • Creator/team name mentions target domain or brand → strong.
  • Workspace name/description mentions target → strong.
  • Request URLs contain *.target.com → strongest signal (workspace is actively used against target's APIs).

Run secret catalog (§17) over every text blob extracted from the requests, env vars, pre-request scripts, and test scripts.

25. Stack Exchange OSINT Sweep

Stack Exchange and its sister sites collect code paste-ins from developers — many include secrets, internal hostnames, and proprietary code excerpts.

Sites to query (8 with highest signal):

stackoverflow.com
serverfault.com
dba.stackexchange.com
devops.stackexchange.com
security.stackexchange.com
superuser.com
sharepoint.stackexchange.com
salesforce.stackexchange.com

API:

GET https://api.stackexchange.com/2.3/search/advanced
   ?site=<site>
   &q=<target>
   &filter=withbody
   &pagesize=100

Code block extraction regex:

<pre><code>([\s\S]*?)</code></pre>

(Stack Exchange wraps code in <pre><code> HTML.)

Pipeline:

  1. Search each site for the target name, brand, root domain.
  2. Extract code blocks from body HTML.
  3. Run secret catalog (§17) over each block.
  4. Cross-reference post author email (where exposed in profile) against email_osint discoveries — confirms employee posting target's internal code.
  5. Extract hostnames from code blocks → upsert as subdomain assets.

Quota: Stack Exchange API permits 30 requests/day without a key; with a free key, 10,000/day. Throttle with 2-second min interval per call.

26. Public SaaS Collaboration Surfaces

Many SaaS collaboration tools allow public sharing. Dork them like search engines.

Platforms with high incident rate:

trello.com
notion.so / notion.site
*.atlassian.net           (Jira / Confluence)
miro.com
asana.com
clickup.com
airtable.com

Dork template:

site:{platform} "{target-keyword}"

Run via search-engine adapter (DDG default; Bing / Brave / Yandex / SerpAPI optional). The same classification logic from §18.7 applies.

Common findings:

  • Public Trello board with credentials in card titles or attached config files.
  • Public Notion page with internal SOPs, API keys in code blocks, customer data.
  • Public Confluence space with onboarding docs containing seed creds.
  • Public Miro board with architecture diagrams revealing internal hostnames.

27. Subdomain-Source Stack (Passive)

Practical "what actually returns useful data in 2026" reference, ordered by recall:

Source Tier Notes
crt.sh Free Best single source for cert-derived subdomains; frequently 502s during peak hours — see fallback chain below.
VirusTotal Freemium Domain → passive DNS history.
AlienVault OTX Free Passive DNS + URL data.
Shodan Paid (low tier) Subdomain enum via domain: filter.
BinaryEdge Paid Comparable to Shodan.
FOFA Freemium Strong China-side coverage.
ZoomEye Freemium Comparable to Shodan; CN-strong.
Netlas Paid Large-scale HTTP/DNS/cert pivots.
SecurityTrails Paid Passive DNS + asset discovery.
RapidDNS Free Public passive DNS.
Subfinder bundled Free Aggregates 30+ free sources via one CLI.
Amass Free Comparable, more thorough, slower.
Recon-ng Free Modular framework; many free providers built in.

DNS AXFR opportunism: for every name server discovered, attempt zone transfer:

dig @<ns-host> <target-domain> AXFR

Most NSs reject; those that don't = full zone disclosure (CRITICAL).

Brute-force tier: Subfinder/Subbrute against assetnote.io wordlists (best-curated public wordlist source).

27.0.1 crt.sh down? Fallback chain (try in order)

crt.sh runs on a single nginx in front of a busy Postgres; 502 / 503 / timeout in peak hours is routine. Don't retry-loop — pivot:

D="target.example"

# 1. Censys cert search (free 250 queries/month with key) — same data, different infra
censys search "names: " --index-type certificates --fields names | jq -r '.names[]' | sort -u

# 2. Cert Spotter API (sslmate) — free w/ rate limits
curl -sk "https://api.certspotter.com/v1/issuances?domain=&include_subdomains=true&expand=dns_names" | \
  jq -r '.[].dns_names[]' | sort -u

# 3. CertStream archive (Calidog) — historical CT log mirror
curl -sk "https://crt.calidog.io/?q=" | jq -r '.[].name_value' | sort -u

# 4. Subfinder bundled aggregator (uses 30+ sources internally — Chaos, Anubis, BinaryEdge, BufferOver, Censys, CertSpotter, Crobat, Crtsh, DNSDumpster, FOFA, Fullhunt, GitHub, HackerTarget, IntelX, PassiveTotal, Quake, Rapiddns, Shodan, Spyse, ThreatBook, ThreatMiner, URLScan, VirusTotal, WhoisXML, ZoomEye, etc.)
subfinder -d  -all -recursive -silent

# 5. AlienVault OTX — free, no key
curl -sk "https://otx.alienvault.com/api/v1/indicators/domain//passive_dns" | \
  jq -r '.passive_dns[].hostname' | sort -u

# 6. ThreatMiner — free
curl -sk "https://api.threatminer.org/v2/domain.php?q=&rt=5" | jq -r '.results[]'

# 7. URLScan — passive DNS via past scans
curl -sk "https://urlscan.io/api/v1/search/?q=domain:" | \
  jq -r '.results[].page.domain' | sort -u

# 8. Anubis-DB / DNSDumpster (HTML scrape, last resort)
curl -sk -A "Mozilla/5.0" "https://anubisdb.com/anubis/subdomains/" | jq -r '.[]'

PowerShell crt.sh wrapper with retry + fallback to Subfinder:

function Get-Subs {
  param()
  for (=0;  -lt 3; ++) {
    try {
       = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://crt.sh/?q=%25.&output=json" -UseBasicParsing -TimeoutSec 90 -UserAgent "Mozilla/5.0"
      return (.Content | ConvertFrom-Json | %{ .name_value -split "`n" } | %{ .Trim().ToLower() } | ?{  -and  -notlike "*@*" -and  -notmatch "^\*\." } | Sort -Unique)
    } catch {
      "crt.sh attempt $(+1) failed; sleep 5s..." | Out-Host
      Start-Sleep -Seconds 5
    }
  }
  "crt.sh down — pivot to Subfinder: subfinder -d  -all -silent" | Out-Host
  return @()
}

27.1 Wordlist Sources for Subdomain + Content Brute-Force

Source URL Notes
Assetnote Wordlists https://wordlists.assetnote.io/ Best-curated; updated regularly. Subdomain top-N (1k, 10k, 100k, 1M, 10M); content-paths per CMS/framework; per-vendor (AWS, Azure, GitLab, etc.).
SecLists https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists Massive collection. Subdomains: Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-110000.txt. Content: Discovery/Web-Content/.
jhaddix all.txt https://gist.github.com/jhaddix/86a06c5dc309d08580a018c66354a056 Long-running curated list.
OneListForAll https://github.com/six2dez/OneListForAll Aggregated; very large (millions).
dirsearch wordlists https://github.com/maurosoria/dirsearch Bundled with the tool.
raft-large-words.txt inside SecLists Discovery/Web-Content/raft-large-words.txt Time-tested content wordlist.
bo0om wordlist https://github.com/bo0om/wordlists Russian-language-aware.
commonspeak2 https://github.com/assetnote/commonspeak2-wordlists Generated from BigQuery commit data.
fuzzdb https://github.com/fuzzdb-project/fuzzdb Fuzzing payloads + wordlists.
PayloadsAllTheThings https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings Per-vuln-class payloads (less for enum, more for follow-on).
Custom per-target n/a Best practice: derive a custom wordlist from the target's own content (extract every word from their public website + LinkedIn + careers page → unique → use as seed).

Size guidance:

  • <10k entries → fast subdomain check (1–2 min); use for opportunistic/passive-supplement.
  • 10k–100k entries → standard depth (10–30 min); use as default brute-force.
  • 100k–1M entries → thorough; use when the target is a known high-value engagement (1–4 hours).
  • >1M entries → exhaustive; reserve for week-long engagements; expect rate-limiting.

Tooling:

# Subfinder + brute-force with assetnote 100k
subfinder -d target.example -all -recursive | tee passive.txt
puredns bruteforce assetnote-best-dns-wordlist.txt target.example -r resolvers.txt | tee brute.txt
cat passive.txt brute.txt | sort -u > all-subs.txt

# Content brute-force on alive hosts
ffuf -u "https://target.example/FUZZ" -w raft-large-words.txt -mc 200,301,403 -t 50 -ac

28. Infrastructure & Attack-Surface OSINT

28.1 ASN/BGP & Internet Measurement

Bulk IP → ASN — recipes that actually work in 2026:

# Cymru bulk WHOIS (fastest; no rate-limit issues; no key required)
echo -e "begin\nverbose\n8.8.8.8\n1.1.1.1\nend" | nc whois.cymru.com 43
# Or one-shot:
whois -h whois.cymru.com " -v 8.8.8.8"

# RIPEstat (free; CORS-friendly; ~1 req/sec polite limit)
curl -sk "https://stat.ripe.net/data/network-info/data.json?resource=8.8.8.8" | jq '.data'

# bgp.tools per-IP API (free; light rate-limit; requires UA)
curl -sk -A "osint-recon/1.0 (contact@example.com)" "https://bgp.tools/api/ip/8.8.8.8" | jq .

# IPinfo Lite (free 50k req/month with free key)
curl -sk "https://ipinfo.io/8.8.8.8?token=<key>" | jq .

Watch out:

  • bgpview.io API has aggressive undocumented rate limits (~1 req/min/IP); not suitable for bulk.
  • bgp.he.net has no public API; HTML scraping only — fragile.
  • PeeringDB is for facility/IX info, not per-IP ASN lookup.
  • For bulk (>50 IPs): use the Cymru bulk format above; it accepts hundreds of IPs in one TCP session.

28.2 Certificates & CT Monitoring

28.3 Web tech / TLS / fingerprinting

  • httpx (ProjectDiscovery) — Wappalyzer-compatible ~600 signatures, JARM, favicon mmh3, TLS cert SHA256, security headers, screenshots. Recommended one-shot probe wrapper for thousands of hosts.
  • JARM — TLS handshake hash; stable per server config; useful for clustering.
  • Wappalyzer browser extension or CLI for tech enumeration.

28.4 TLS Deep Audit

Beyond the cert SAN + JARM, inspect cipher suites, protocols, and config quality.

sslyze (most thorough):

pip install sslyze
sslyze --regular target.example:443
sslyze --json_out=tls.json target.example:443

Reports: protocols supported (TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2/1.3), cipher suites per protocol, cert chain, OCSP, key info, robot/heartbleed/lucky13/poodle/freak/logjam/drown/ccs/ticketbleed.

testssl.sh (thorough + readable output):

docker run --rm -ti drwetter/testssl.sh https://target.example
# Or native install: https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh
testssl.sh --jsonfile-pretty=tls-report.json target.example:443

nmap script alternative (lighter):

nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers,ssl-cert -p 443 target.example

Check for these issues:

Issue Severity What to look for
TLS 1.0 / 1.1 supported MEDIUM Deprecated; PCI-DSS forbids TLS 1.0.
SSL 3.0 / 2.0 supported HIGH Critically deprecated.
Weak ciphers (RC4, 3DES, CBC modes) MEDIUM RC4 = NOMORE attack; 3DES = SWEET32.
Anonymous DH HIGH No authentication.
Self-signed cert on production MEDIUM Trust failure.
Expired cert MEDIUM Operational + trust failure.
Cert valid for too long (>397 days) LOW Browser warnings since 2020.
Wildcard cert covering critical hosts INFO Operational risk if private key compromised.
Weak key size (<2048 RSA, <256 ECDSA) HIGH Cryptographically weak.
Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160) CRITICAL Memory disclosure.
ROBOT (CVE-2017-13099) HIGH Bleichenbacher.
CCS injection (CVE-2014-0224) HIGH OpenSSL specific.
Ticketbleed (CVE-2016-9244) HIGH F5-specific memory disclosure.
HSTS not present (covered §16.4) MEDIUM Header audit.

JA3 / JA4 reference databases:

  • ja3er.com — community-curated JA3 → client-software mapping.
  • TLS Fingerprint DB — research aggregator.
  • For server JARM: search Shodan ssl.jarm:<hash> to find shared infrastructure / origin candidates (see §16.15).

28.5 Reverse DNS Sweep & IPv6 Enumeration

When a target owns an IP range (their ASN), enumerate it.

Reverse DNS sweep (within scope):

# Single /24
for i in $(seq 1 254); do
  IP="203.0.113."
  PTR=$(dig +short -x )
  [ -n "" ] && echo " -> "
done

# Larger range with parallelism
prips 203.0.113.0/22 | xargs -I {} -P 50 sh -c 'PTR=$(dig +short -x {}); [ -n "" ] && echo "{} -> "'

Mass DNS approach (better for large ranges):

# zdns: install via go install github.com/zmap/zdns/cmd/zdns@latest
prips 203.0.113.0/22 | zdns PTR

Banner-only sweep (no DNS round trip):

# masscan + banner-grab
sudo masscan -p80,443 203.0.113.0/22 --rate=1000 --banners -oX masscan.xml

IPv6 enumeration:

IPv6 has weaker enumeration tradition (huge address space precludes brute-force) but the AAAA records and known-allocation prefixes are still useful.

# AAAA records for every discovered subdomain
for sub in $(cat all-subs.txt); do
  AAAA=$(dig +short AAAA )
  [ -n "" ] && echo " -> "
done

# IPv6 reverse DNS sweep is generally infeasible (2^64 host bits per subnet)
# Instead: extract IPv6 prefixes from the target's allocations
whois -h whois.cymru.com " -v target.example.com"   # gets ASN; then look up prefix

BGP route observation:

  • RouteViews — http://archive.routeviews.org/ (free; historical BGP routing table snapshots).
  • RIPE RIS — https://ris.ripe.net/ (free; route collectors).
  • Use these to detect route hijacks against the target's prefixes (defensive intel; sometimes IOC).

Reverse DNS pivots from third-party IPs:

If a third-party shows the target's domain in PTR records (e.g., a hosting provider's IP has PTR customer-acme.example.com.hostingprovider.net), that's a pivot for adjacent customer infrastructure on the same provider/datacenter.

29. Threat Intel & IOCs

29.1 Malware Analysis & Sandboxes

29.2 Vulnerability Prioritization Data Sources

Methodology in companion skill §28. Concrete data sources here.

Source URL What it tells you
NVD https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search (or API services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0) Base CVE catalog with CVSS v2/v3 scores.
EPSS https://www.first.org/epss/ (CSV at https://epss.cyentia.com/epss_scores-current.csv.gz) 0.0-1.0 probability of exploit in next 30 days. Updated daily.
CISA KEV https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json CVEs proven exploited in the wild + federal-agency due-by dates.
ExploitDB https://www.exploit-db.com/; offline DB via searchsploit POC code presence (Metasploit, Python, shell).
Metasploit module catalog https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/ (or msfconsole > search cve:CVE-2024-XXXX) Automation availability.
InTheWild.io https://inthewild.io/ Community-curated "actively exploited" tracker.
OpenCVE https://www.opencve.io/ Timeline + watchlist + alerts.
Trickest CVE → POC mapping https://github.com/trickest/cve Auto-generated CVE → public POC repo links.
GitHub Security Advisories https://github.com/advisories Per-language / per-ecosystem advisories.
MITRE CVE List https://cve.mitre.org/cve/ Official CVE registry.
VulnDB https://vulndb.cyberriskanalytics.com/ Paid; commercial enrichment.
OSV.dev https://osv.dev/ Open-source vulnerability DB; JSON API.
Vulncheck KEV https://vulncheck.com/kev Expanded KEV feed (more than CISA).
Tenable Research https://www.tenable.com/research Tenable's CVE detail enrichment.
Qualys ThreatPROTECT https://threatprotect.qualys.com/ Qualys' threat-context enrichment.

Workflow:

# 1. Get EPSS score for a CVE
curl -sk "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2024-3400" | jq '.data[0]'

# 2. Check if in CISA KEV
curl -sk https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json | \
  jq '.vulnerabilities[] | select(.cveID == "CVE-2024-3400")'

# 3. Check ExploitDB
searchsploit cve 2024-3400

# 4. Check Metasploit
msfconsole -q -x "search cve:2024-3400; exit"

Bulk prioritization (given a Nuclei scan output with N CVEs):

# Extract CVEs from nuclei JSON output
jq -r '.info.classification.["cve-id"][]?' nuclei-results.json | sort -u > cves.txt

# Annotate each with EPSS + KEV
while IFS= read -r CVE; do
  EPSS=$(curl -sk "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=" | jq -r '.data[0].epss // "N/A"')
  KEV=$(curl -sk https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json | \
    jq --arg c "" '.vulnerabilities[] | select(.cveID == ) | .vulnerabilityName // empty')
  KEV_FLAG=$([ -n "" ] && echo "KEV" || echo "")
  echo " | EPSS: | "
done < cves.txt | sort -t: -k2 -nr

### 29.3 HackerOne Disclosed Reports Reference

Use `skills/offensive-osint/scripts/h1_reference.py` (no API key required, public GraphQL) to pull community-validated findings as reference while testing. Run it at session start for the target's tech stack or attack type.

**Key modes:**
```bash
# Top voted community reports — best validated techniques
python3 skills/offensive-osint/scripts/h1_reference.py --top-voted --limit 25

# Highest bounty reports — business-impact framing reference
python3 skills/offensive-osint/scripts/h1_reference.py --top-bounty --limit 10

# Keyword search across pages (50 results/page)
python3 skills/offensive-osint/scripts/h1_reference.py --top-voted --query "SSRF" --pages 10
python3 skills/offensive-osint/scripts/h1_reference.py --top-voted --query "auth bypass|OAuth|OIDC" --pages 5
python3 skills/offensive-osint/scripts/h1_reference.py --top-voted --query "open redirect" --pages 5

# Filter by severity (client-side)
python3 skills/offensive-osint/scripts/h1_reference.py --top-bounty --severity critical high --pages 3

# Program-specific disclosures (requires program handle)
python3 skills/offensive-osint/scripts/h1_reference.py --program gitlab --pages 5
python3 skills/offensive-osint/scripts/h1_reference.py --lookup-program gitlab   # resolve handle → team ID

# JSON output for piping / jq
python3 skills/offensive-osint/scripts/h1_reference.py --top-voted --query "XSS" --pages 5 --json | jq '.[].report.url'

When to run:

  • At session start: --top-voted to load high-signal baseline
  • After identifying target's tech stack: --query "<tech>" --pages 10
  • Before probing a specific attack class: --query "SSRF|XXE|SSTI" --pages 5
  • For report writing: --query "<vuln type>" --top-bounty to find comparable severity/bounty

H1 GraphQL quirks (documented):

  • Max 50 results/page regardless of first: value — use --pages for breadth
  • disclosed_at field crashes H1 server when combined with substate filter — omitted
  • Sort + substate filter combo crashes — script auto-routes around this

30. Cryptocurrency OSINT

30.1 Blockchain Explorers

Chain Explorer
Bitcoin Blockchain.com, Blockchair
Ethereum Etherscan
BNB Chain BSCScan
Polygon PoS PolygonScan
Solana Solscan
Multi-chain OKLink (freemium), Cielo

30.2 L2 / Rollup Explorers

L2 Explorer Notes
Arbitrum Arbiscan Optimistic rollup; 7-day challenge window.
Optimism Optimistic Etherscan Optimistic rollup; 7-day challenge window.
Base BaseScan OP Stack.
Blast Blastscan OP Stack derivative.
Scroll Scrollscan zkEVM.
zkSync Era zkSync Era Block Explorer zkRollup; faster finality.
Polygon zkEVM PolygonScan zkEVM zkEVM.
StarkNet Voyager, StarkScan Cairo VM; different address derivation.
Cross-L2 L2Beat Risk framework + TVL comparison.

30.3 Transaction Tracking & Analytics

30.4 NFT / Exchange / Bridges

31. Media Intelligence

31.1 Reverse Image & Facial Search

31.2 Image Forensics

31.3 Video Analysis

31.4 Browser Extensions for Media

32. Geospatial Intelligence

32.1 Satellite & Mapping

32.2 Geolocation Tools

Street View: Google Street View, Apple Maps, Yandex Maps, Baidu Maps.

32.3 Flight OSINT

32.4 Maritime OSINT

33. AI-Assisted OSINT

Warning: Never paste PII, sensitive IOCs, or unique pivots into cloud LLMs. They log inputs and may use them for training. Use local models for sensitive analysis.

Tool Strength
ChatGPT (paid) Log parsing, dataset analysis, Code Interpreter for CSV/JSON, Vision OCR.
Claude (paid) 200K-token context for large doc dumps + report synthesis.
Gemini Long-context; Deep Research mode with citations.
Perplexity Pro (paid) Real-time web search + reasoning.

Local / privacy-preserving: Ollama, LM Studio, GPT4All.

33.1 Commercial AI OSINT Platforms

33.2 Deepfake & Synthetic Media Detection

34. Archiving & Evidence Preservation

  • archive.today — one-page archiver + screenshot.
  • URLScan.io — webpage scan + resource map.
  • ArchiveBox — self-hosted (HTML, PDF, screenshots, media).
  • Hunchly — investigator evidence capture (paid).
  • Wayback SavePageNow API v3 — on-demand archiving with job IDs.
  • SingleFileZ — browser ext for offline HTML.
  • Kasm Workspaces — containerized OSINT browser isolation.

Evidence handling: URL + UTC timestamp + PNG + WARC/SingleFileZ archive, SHA-256 hash all downloads, separate work profiles per case, store evidence read-only, JSONL run logs with run_id + tool versions.

35. Automation & Workflows

  • n8n — self-hosted workflow automation (RSS → scrape → alert pipelines).
  • Huginn — agent-based monitoring/scraping/alerting.
  • Playwright — headless browser automation with stealth plugins.
  • Browsertrix Crawler — archival crawling with WARC export.
  • Prefect / Apache Airflow — workflow orchestration.

36. Cross-Module Sidecar Coordination

When you run a multi-module recon, late-arriving outputs need to feed into already-running modules. The pattern:

  1. Each module writes a sidecar JSON to a known location when it finishes:
    • <scan>/mobile_endpoints.json — endpoints + hostnames extracted from APK static analysis.
    • <scan>/secrets_sidecar.json — hostnames + endpoints + Firebase project IDs from secrets-beyond-github sweep.
    • <scan>/sso_tenants.json — discovered IdP tenants for breach correlation.
  2. Downstream modules check for sidecars on start; if present, ingest.
  3. Cross-feed: API discovery consumes both mobile_endpoints.json and secrets_sidecar.json; SSO×breach correlation consumes sso_tenants.json and the breach DB.

Sidecar shape (mobile_endpoints.json example):

{
  "endpoints": [
    {"method": "GET", "url": "https://api.acme.com/v1/users", "source": "apk:com.acme.android"},
    {"method": "POST", "url": "https://api.acme.com/v1/login", "source": "apk:com.acme.android"}
  ],
  "hostnames": ["api.acme.com", "cdn.acme.com"],
  "firebase_project_ids": ["acme-prod-12345"]
}

When you implement an ad-hoc multi-tool recon (no platform), use a tmpdir + JSON sidecars + a one-line manifest pattern. Composable, debuggable, replay-able.

37. Regional Search Engines

38. Telegram & Messaging Intelligence

39. Attack-Path Hint Patterns

When emitting a HIGH/CRITICAL API endpoint finding (score ≥ 70), include a one-sentence attack_path_hint in evidence so the operator knows where to start exploiting. Templates:

Trigger Attack-path hint
Unauth POST / PUT / DELETE "Unauthenticated {method} {path} — try IDOR + privilege escalation; check whether numeric IDs are sequential or guessable."
Open GraphQL introspection "Open GraphQL introspection on {path} — enumerate mutations, look for createUser, setRole, transferFunds-shaped names; pivot to broken-auth or business-logic flaws."
Reflected CORS + creds "Reflected CORS with credentials on {path} — host CSRF page on attacker-controlled origin; victim's browser will leak {sensitive-data-hint}."
Wildcard CORS + sensitive "Wildcard CORS on {path} returning user-tied data without creds — exfiltrate via cross-origin fetch from any page victim visits."
Verb tampering "Verb tampering: {hidden-method} allowed on documented-{visible-method}-only endpoint → likely missing-method-check authz bug; try {hidden-method} {path} with valid auth."
API key in URL "API key in URL: ?{param}=... — token leaks to access logs, browser history, Referer headers, third-party CDNs. Check Wayback / Google for cached copies."
Schema leak in error "Schema leak in error response — framework signature {framework} exposed; map to known {framework} vulns and craft targeted payloads."
Sensitive keyword "Path contains '{keyword}' — review for direct object reference, mass-assignment, or hidden admin functionality."
Open RTDB Firebase "Open Firebase RTDB at https://{project}.firebaseio.com/.json — read everything, then test write at /<random-key>.json with PUT to gauge ACL scope."
Listable cloud bucket "Listable {provider} bucket {bucket} — recursive object listing + content-type analysis; look for backups, logs, customer data, AWS keys in JSON configs."
.git exposed "Exposed .git/config on {host} — reconstruct repository with git-dumper or githacker; full source history."
.env exposed "Exposed .env on {host} — grep for _KEY, _SECRET, _TOKEN, _PASSWORD; validate all credentials read-only via §23 validators."
/actuator/env "Spring Boot /actuator/env exposed — dump environment variables; look for spring.datasource.password, JWT secrets, cloud creds."
/actuator/heapdump "Spring Boot /actuator/heapdump exposed — download HPROF, run jhat or VisualVM, search for cleartext secrets in heap strings."
Open Elasticsearch "Open Elasticsearch on {host}:9200 — /_cat/indices?v for index list; sample documents from each high-value index; test write to /test-idx/_doc to gauge ACL."
Open Redis "Open Redis on {host}:6379 — INFO, KEYS *, sample reads; check for write access via CONFIG SET then BGSAVE to write authorized_keys."
Open MongoDB "Open MongoDB on {host}:27017 — show dbs, show collections, sample find queries; check user collection for password hashes."
Subdomain takeover "CNAME for {host} points to unclaimed {provider} resource → register {takeover-target} on {provider} to serve content from {host}; pivot to phishing or content injection on the trusted domain."
Open kubelet "Open kubelet on {host}:10250 — GET /pods to list; POST /run/<ns>/<pod>/<container> for in-container exec without K8s API auth."
Open etcd "Open etcd on {host}:2379 — etcdctl get / --prefix --keys-only for full cluster state; secrets stored under /registry/secrets/."
K8s API anonymous "Kubernetes API on {host}:6443 with anonymous-auth — kubectl --server=https://{host}:6443 --insecure-skip-tls-verify get pods --all-namespaces."
Citrix unpatched "Citrix NetScaler version {ver} on {host} — vulnerable to CVE-{cve} (KEV-listed); see vendor advisory; do not exploit but flag for client immediate patching."
F5 BIG-IP TMUI exposed "F5 BIG-IP TMUI on {host} reachable; CVE-2022-1388 / CVE-2023-46747 KEV applicable; advise immediate patching to vendor-released hotfix."
VMware vCenter accessible "vCenter at {host} accessible without VPN; CVE-2021-21972 RCE if unpatched; check version banner."
Cloud function URL unauth "AWS Lambda Function URL at {url} accessible anonymously — review IAM auth configuration; if unauthenticated by design, audit input validation aggressively."
npm typosquat candidate "Package name {candidate} is unregistered + similar to target's published {official} — typosquat takeover risk; advise client to defensively register."
DMARC missing/permissive "DMARC p=none on {domain} — spoof of {anything}@{domain} deliverable to recipients; recommend enforcement to p=quarantine or p=reject after observing reports."
Live AI API key (Anthropic/OpenAI) "Validated sk-{provider}-... key with model access — quota cost can be exfiltrated; rotate immediately + audit usage logs in provider console."
Public Slack invite link "Slack workspace invite link discoverable via search engine — anyone can join the workspace without approval; trivially access internal channels."
Open Docker registry "Public Docker registry at {host} — GET /v2/_catalog lists images; pull and scan layers for embedded secrets."
Telegram bot token live "Telegram bot token validated — getUpdates reveals bot recipients (admin chats); if getMe shows bot is in channels, full message read access."
Sourcemap with sourcesContent[] "Sourcemap on {host} includes embedded original sources — full frontend code reconstructable; grep for inline secrets and internal hostnames."

40. Severity Decision Matrix — Worked Examples

When in doubt, anchor on these worked examples (drawn from real engagements):

Finding Severity Why
/.git/config reachable on prod webapp CRITICAL Full source-code disclosure; secret history reconstructable.
/.env reachable on prod webapp CRITICAL Plaintext creds (DB, cloud, API).
Open Firebase RTDB returning data CRITICAL All app data readable; often writable.
Listable S3 bucket containing PII CRITICAL Direct data exfil.
Listable S3 bucket containing logs only HIGH Internal hostnames + paths in logs; pivot data.
Spring Boot /actuator/env exposed CRITICAL DB creds, JWT secrets, cloud keys in env.
Spring Boot /actuator/heapdump exposed CRITICAL Heap contains live secrets in string form.
Open Elasticsearch (/_cat/indices returns) CRITICAL Full data reads; often writable.
Open MongoDB (no auth) CRITICAL Full data + password-hash collection.
Open Redis (no AUTH) CRITICAL Write authorized_keys → SSH foothold.
Open Docker API (port 2375) CRITICAL Container/host takeover.
Public PMAK validated live with broad scope CRITICAL Full Postman account + all team workspaces.
Public AWS root access key validated live CRITICAL Full account compromise.
Live AWS IAM-user key found on GitHub HIGH Limited scope (depends on IAM policy); often elevatable.
Live GitHub PAT found in JS bundle HIGH Repo write access (depends on scope).
Live Slack token in pastebin HIGH Workspace data + history; sometimes channel post.
Sourcemap (.js.map) accessible on prod HIGH Frontend source disclosure.
Open GraphQL introspection on prod HIGH Full schema → mutations + business-logic discovery.
Subdomain takeover possible (Heroku / GitHub Pages / etc.) HIGH Takeover → phishing on trusted domain.
Reflected CORS with credentials on /api/billing HIGH CSRF-via-CORS for billing data.
Verb tampering: DELETE allowed on documented-GET-only endpoint HIGH Authz bypass; potentially destructive.
phpinfo.php reachable on prod HIGH Discloses paths, env vars, modules → vuln-version pivot.
Tomcat /manager/html reachable HIGH Often default creds; WAR upload = RCE.
Jenkins script console accessible HIGH Groovy script execution = RCE.
Missing HSTS on /login HIGH (escalated from MED) Login pages must enforce HSTS.
Missing HSTS on standard pages MEDIUM Hardening gap.
Missing CSP MEDIUM XSS impact mitigation gone.
Internal IP / K8s service DNS in JS MEDIUM Internal topology disclosure.
Apache /server-status reachable MEDIUM Live request visibility.
android:debuggable=true on prod app CRITICAL Production debug-build → full client compromise.
android:allowBackup=true (no whitelist) MEDIUM App data exfil via adb backup.
android:usesCleartextTraffic=true MEDIUM MITM-able on hostile networks.
Sensitive deep-link handler (myapp://reset-password) HIGH Other apps can trigger sensitive flows.
Exported Android component without permission MEDIUM IPC attack surface.
Slack webhook URL leaked MEDIUM Send to channel; can be used for social-eng.
Twilio Account SID leaked (no auth token) MEDIUM Half a credential pair; plus account enumeration.
Wildcard CORS on data-returning API MEDIUM Lower than reflected+creds but still exfil-able.
Missing X-Frame-Options LOW Clickjacking.
.DS_Store exposed LOW Directory listing of dev's machine.
Stripe test key leaked LOW No real money risk.
Firebase URL exposed (no open RTDB) LOW Project-ID disclosure only.
Cert pinning missing in mobile app LOW MITM possible on hostile networks.
Outdated WordPress install detected LOW Pending CVE confirmation.
Missing Referrer-Policy / Permissions-Policy INFO Hardening, not an exposure.
/.well-known/security.txt discovered INFO Useful contact info only.
Domain in breach with 0 named accounts INFO Contextual only.
Private bucket exists (HEAD 403) INFO Asset only, no finding.
Open kubelet on 10250 CRITICAL Pod exec without K8s API auth.
Open etcd on 2379 CRITICAL Cluster state + secrets.
K8s API on 6443 with anonymous-auth HIGH Cluster recon; sometimes pod exec.
K8s dashboard exposed without auth HIGH Cluster admin UI.
Helm Tiller (Helm 2) on 44134 HIGH Cluster-admin scope.
Citrix Netscaler with KEV CVE CRITICAL Patch immediately; actively exploited.
F5 BIG-IP TMUI accessible HIGH TMUI = admin panel; CVE-2022-1388 if unpatched = CRIT.
Pulse Secure with CVE-2024-21887 CRITICAL KEV; chained command injection.
FortiGate with CVE-2024-21762 CRITICAL KEV; auth bypass + RCE.
PaloAlto GlobalProtect with CVE-2024-3400 CRITICAL KEV; pre-auth RCE.
VMware vCenter with CVE-2021-21972 CRITICAL KEV; pre-auth RCE.
VMware ESXi exposed without VPN HIGH Multiple CVEs (ESXiArgs ransomware vector).
MS Exchange with ProxyShell/Logon/NotShell unpatched CRITICAL KEV chain; RCE + mailbox dump.
AWS Lambda Function URL accessible anonymously HIGH Direct invocation; check IAM auth posture.
Public Cloud Run / Cloud Function unauthenticated HIGH Same.
Public Docker registry (anonymous catalog) MEDIUM Image enum + secret hunt in layers.
GitHub Actions secrets echoed in workflow logs HIGH Secret-in-log = full secret disclosure.
GitHub Actions pull_request_target checkout of fork code HIGH Class of bug; secrets accessible to attacker PRs.
GitLab self-hosted with CVE-2021-22205 CRITICAL KEV; ExifTool RCE.
Jenkins with pull_request_target-equivalent misconfig HIGH Build secrets accessible to PRs.
Public Notion page with internal SOPs MEDIUM Operational intel; sometimes credentials.
Public Trello board with credentials in cards HIGH Often plaintext API keys.
Public Confluence space with onboarding docs MEDIUM Seed creds + tech-stack reveal.
Public Miro board with architecture diagrams LOW Internal-host disclosure.
DMARC policy p=none on production sending domain MEDIUM Spoof feasible (escalated from LOW for risk surface).
SPF ~all (softfail) without strict DMARC MEDIUM Spoofs land in spam, but land.
MX server allows open relay (test with 250 OK to RCPT TO foreign domain) HIGH Spam + spoof feasibility.
Live Anthropic / OpenAI API key with broad scope CRITICAL Quota cost + potential PII in past responses.
Live npm token with publish scope CRITICAL Supply-chain compromise of all maintained packages.
Live PyPI / Docker Hub / GHCR token with publish scope CRITICAL Supply-chain compromise.
Atlassian token with admin scope HIGH Workspace-wide read; sometimes write.
Subdomain takeover candidate confirmed HIGH Trusted-domain phishing surface.
Sensitive CI/CD wordlist hits (Jenkinsfile, .gitlab-ci.yml on public repo) MEDIUM Build-script intel; often references secret names.
Public Postman workspace with internal API endpoints MEDIUM API attack surface mapped.
WAF/CDN trivially bypassable (origin discoverable via §16.15) HIGH All WAF protections null.
TLS 1.0/1.1 supported on prod MEDIUM Compliance gap; PCI-DSS forbids TLS 1.0.
RC4 / 3DES cipher accepted MEDIUM NOMORE / SWEET32 attacks.
Cert about to expire (<30 days) LOW Operational risk; not exploitable.
Self-signed cert on prod MEDIUM Trust failure for users.
Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160) detected CRITICAL Memory disclosure including session tokens + keys.
Public Slack invite link discoverable HIGH Anyone joins workspace; full DM/channel access.
Vendor / supplier / e-procurement portal publicly exposed + breach corpus shows vendor accounts compromised HIGH Vendor impersonation + procurement fraud (BEC vector); regulatory exposure if PII/payment data flows.
Job-application / careers portal collects PII over plain HTTP (no TLS) HIGH Cleartext PII at scale; regulatory exposure under GDPR / CCPA / India DPDP Act / LGPD.
Decommissioned legacy mail (NXDOMAIN today) + breach corpus has historical employee URLs against it + cloud SSO migration confirmed via autodiscover IPs CRITICAL Stolen passwords almost certainly survived migration via reuse; SSO_EXPOSURE escalates regardless of the legacy host being dead.
Public-facing intranet (intranet.<domain> resolves and returns content without VPN) MEDIUM Internal-staff portal exposed; often leaks org structure, employee directory, internal apps.
Staging / preprod / UAT / sandbox subdomain publicly resolvable MEDIUM Often weaker auth, debug endpoints, test creds; sometimes mirrors prod data.
vpn.<domain> resolves but vendor + version unknown (passive only) INFO Attack surface flag only; escalate to HIGH-CRITICAL after active fingerprint matches a KEV CVE (§16.16).
DMARC RUA points to a third-party reporting vendor (kdmarc / dmarcian / Valimail / Agari / EasyDMARC) INFO Tenant signal only; vendor compromise = DMARC bypass for all their customers.

41. LinkedIn Employee Enumeration

LinkedIn is the highest-signal source for employee enumeration during external red-team work. Use it for: target list generation, role prioritization, email-pattern derivation, pretext development.

41.1 Search techniques

Free LinkedIn (no Sales Navigator):

  • People-search by company: https://www.linkedin.com/search/results/people/?currentCompany=["<company-id>"]. Get company-id from the company's LinkedIn URL or profile JSON.
  • Bypass connection-degree filter: search shows 1st/2nd-degree only by default; use Google dorking instead.

Google dork for LinkedIn employee enum:

site:linkedin.com/in "<company name>"
site:linkedin.com/in "<company name>" "engineer"   # role filter
site:linkedin.com/in "<company name>" "<location>" # location filter
site:linkedin.com/in "<company name>" -inurl:/posts

Bing/DuckDuckGo equivalents — sometimes return different result sets; cross-engine union.

LinkedIn Sales Navigator (paid):

  • Most efficient if available. Lead lists by company × role × seniority. Export CSV.

Tools:

  • theHarvester with -b linkedin source (uses search-engine-driven enum).
  • CrossLinked — https://github.com/m8r0wn/CrossLinked — CLI tool that does the LinkedIn dorking.
  • LinkedInDumper / Linkook — open-source enum tools (verify currency; they break frequently).
  • PhantomBuster / Apollo.io / RocketReach / Hunter.io Email Finder — paid SaaS that does the enum + email derivation in one workflow.

41.2 Role inference for prioritization

For each enumerated employee, capture:

  • Name (canonical form: First Last; remove suffixes like "PMP", "PhD" for email-pattern matching).
  • Job title (raw + normalized to a role tier).
  • Tenure (years at company; longer = more access typically).
  • Location (city / region; informs phishing time-of-day).
  • Recent activity (posts, comments, articles — informs pretext).

Role priority for breach lookup + phishing target list:

Role tier Examples Why
P0 CEO, CFO, CTO, CISO, CIO, COO, GC, CRO Exec accounts; BEC + finance + legal authority.
P1 VP / Director of IT / Security / Engineering / Finance / HR Privileged tool access; reset workflows.
P2 DevOps, SRE, Platform, Security Engineer, DBA GitHub / cloud / CI access; secrets in their accounts.
P3 Software Engineer, Architect, Senior Developer Code + occasional cloud access.
P4 Sales, Marketing, HR, Finance Analyst, Customer Support SaaS access (Salesforce, HubSpot, Workday); BEC enabler.
P5 Generic individual contributor, intern, contractor Lowest single-account value but breadth matters.

41.3 Email-pattern derivation from confirmed names

For each captured name, derive candidate emails using §11 templates. Cross-reference against:

  • Hunter.io domain-search to confirm pattern.
  • Breach corpus (HudsonRock + HIBP + DeHashed + IntelX) to find matches.

41.4 Sock-puppet considerations

  • Never connect from the corporate persona. LinkedIn shows "viewed your profile" notifications.
  • Use a sock puppet with a plausible profile (5+ years built history, similar industry, mutual connections to throw off correlation). Tools: persona-builder workflows.
  • LinkedIn "private mode" (anonymous viewing) — toggle in settings; reduces one signal but Sales Navigator can still see anonymized "someone viewed your profile."
  • Connection requests are detectable. Don't send any during recon.
  • Profile views accumulate suspicion if you view 100+ employees of one company in a day. Throttle: <20/day per persona.

41.5 Output

Per discovered employee:

Person:
  name:        "Alice Doe"
  title:       "Senior DevOps Engineer"
  role_tier:   P2
  company:     "Acme Corp"
  location:    "Boston, MA"
  linkedin_url: https://www.linkedin.com/in/alicedoe
  derived_emails:
    - alice.doe@acme.com    (TENTATIVE)
    - adoe@acme.com         (TENTATIVE)
    - alice@acme.com        (TENTATIVE)
  breach_hits:
    - alice.doe@acme.com    (HudsonRock; cleartext password redacted; FIRM)
  pretext_hooks:
    - "DevOps tooling vendor evaluation" (recent posts)
    - "Boston DevOps Days speaker" (conference activity)

42. Job Posting Tech-Stack Analysis

Job postings reveal the target's internal tech stack with surprising precision. Free, public, and they include the exact vendor names.

42.1 Sources

Platform URL Notes
LinkedIn Jobs https://www.linkedin.com/jobs/search/?keywords=&f_C=<company-id> Most current; require LI account.
Indeed https://www.indeed.com/cmp/<company> Company page with job feed.
Glassdoor https://www.glassdoor.com/Jobs/<company>-Jobs-E<id>.htm Plus salary data + employee reviews.
Lever (ATS) https://jobs.lever.co/<company> Direct ATS — full job descriptions.
Greenhouse (ATS) https://boards.greenhouse.io/<company> Direct ATS.
Workable (ATS) https://apply.workable.com/<company>/ Direct ATS.
AshbyHQ (ATS) https://jobs.ashbyhq.com/<company> Direct ATS.
AngelList / Wellfound https://wellfound.com/company/<company>/jobs Startup-focused.
BuiltIn https://builtin.com/companies/view/<company> Tech-focused.
Stack Overflow Jobs (deprecated 2022 but archive available) Historical tech-stack data.
Company careers page https://careers.<target>.com or https://<target>.com/careers Direct source; sometimes more detail than ATS.

42.2 What to extract

For each job posting, harvest:

  • Required technologies ("must have experience with X, Y, Z") → confirmed in-use.
  • Nice-to-have technologies → likely in use but maybe in transition.
  • Vendor names (Workday, Salesforce, Snowflake, Databricks, Datadog, etc.) → SaaS tenants.
  • Internal tool / project codenames (often slip into "you'll work on Project Aurora") → recon vocabulary.
  • Team size hints ("part of a 12-person platform team") → org-structure intel.
  • Office locations ("hybrid 3 days in Boston office") → physical recon.
  • Cloud + on-prem ratio hints ("migrating from on-prem to AWS") → posture intel.
  • Compliance frameworks mentioned (SOC2, FedRAMP, HIPAA, PCI) → defensive priorities + reporting context.

42.3 Tooling

  • scrapy / BeautifulSoup — custom scrapers per ATS.
  • theHarvester with appropriate sources.
  • JobScraper scripts on GitHub.
  • Manual — for small targets, manual review of 20–30 postings is fast and high-fidelity.

42.4 Output

Per discovered tech mention:

Tech_inferred:
  product:     "Snowflake"
  category:    "data warehouse"
  source:      "linkedin job posting #<id>"
  source_url:  https://www.linkedin.com/jobs/view/...
  confidence:  TENTATIVE  (job listing implies in-use; not yet confirmed by direct probe)
  posting_date: 2026-03-15
  required_or_nice: "required"

Aggregate to a target tech-stack profile that informs:

  • Which secret patterns to look for (Snowflake-specific keys, Databricks tokens).
  • Which SaaS tenants to fingerprint (Snowflake account URL pattern).
  • Which vendor-product fingerprints to probe (Snowflake DSN paths in JS).

43. Slack / Discord / Telegram Workspace Discovery

43.1 Slack

  • Public workspace search (limited; Slack used to have one but deprecated):
    • Slofile (third-party): https://slofile.com/ — community Slack workspace directory.
    • Slacklist / Slack Communities — community-curated lists.
  • Invite-link enumeration — Slack invite URLs follow https://join.slack.com/t/<workspace-slug>/shared_invite/<token>. Common discovery:
    • Google: site:join.slack.com "{target}" or inurl:slack.com inurl:shared_invite "{target}".
    • GitHub: "join.slack.com/t/<target-stem>" filename:README.
    • Twitter/X / Reddit: search for shared invite links.
  • Confirm workspace exists: visit https://<slug>.slack.com/api/auth.test (returns workspace metadata when called by an authenticated session, but the page itself returns differently per workspace existence).
  • High-value finding: any open invite link that bypasses the target's normal member-approval flow → operator can join workspace without authorization → MEDIUM/HIGH finding (depending on what's in the workspace).

43.2 Discord

  • Discord server discovery is harder (no central public directory).
  • DiscordServers.com — third-party directory.
  • Discord.me / Top.gg — community directories.
  • Google: site:discord.gg "{target}" or site:discord.com "{target}".
  • Confirm server: invite URLs https://discord.gg/<token> resolve to a JSON via https://discord.com/api/v9/invites/<token>?with_counts=true. Returns server name, ID, member count, channel info.
  • Bot enumeration: if you find a bot token (catalog §17 row 47), use getMe to get bot identity + servers it's joined to (read-only check).

43.3 Telegram

Already covered in §38. Quick reference:

  • TGStat — channel analytics + search.
  • Telemetr — channel growth + overlaps.
  • Combot — group analytics.
  • View public channels: https://t.me/s/<channel>.
  • Invite link enum: search Google site:t.me "{target}".

43.4 Microsoft Teams (federation)

  • See companion methodology skill §11.10.
  • Federation status check via Microsoft Graph (auth-required).
  • Open-federation default = anyone can chat target's users with <email>@<target> lookup.

43.5 Mattermost / Rocket.Chat / self-hosted

  • https://mattermost.<target>.com or chat.<target> patterns.
  • Open registration check: probe /signup page; if accessible without invite → anyone joins.
  • Check version disclosure (/api/v4/system/ping) for known CVEs.

44. Package Registry Leak Hunting

Public package registries (npm, PyPI, RubyGems, Docker Hub, etc.) often contain inadvertent secrets in published packages.

44.1 npm

  • Search packages by org / scope: 
    npm search "<target-keyword>"
npm view @<scope>/<package-name>
  • List org's packages: https://www.npmjs.com/org/<org> or https://registry.npmjs.org/-/org/<org>/package.
  • Per-package historical versions: https://registry.npmjs.org/<package> — JSON with all versions.
  • Tarball download for scan: 
    npm pack <package>@<version>
tar -xzf package-version.tgz
# Run secret catalog (§17) on extracted files
  • Common leaks: .env files included in published tarball, package.json scripts references to internal CI secrets, hardcoded API keys in dist/ builds.

44.2 PyPI

  • Search packages: https://pypi.org/search/?q=<target>.
  • Per-package metadata + history: https://pypi.org/pypi/<package>/json.
  • Download wheel/sdist for scan: 
    pip download <package>==<version> --no-deps -d /tmp/pkg
unzip /tmp/pkg/*.whl -d /tmp/pkg/extracted
# Run secret catalog
  • Common leaks: setup.py with hardcoded URLs, embedded test fixtures with real credentials, accidentally-included .pypirc files.

44.3 RubyGems

  • Search: https://rubygems.org/search?query=<target>.
  • Per-gem metadata: https://rubygems.org/api/v1/gems/<gem-name>.json.
  • Download: 
    gem fetch <gem-name>
gem unpack <gem-name>-<version>.gem

44.4 Cargo (Rust crates)

  • Search: https://crates.io/search?q=<target>.
  • Per-crate metadata: https://crates.io/api/v1/crates/<crate-name>.

44.5 Packagist (PHP / Composer)

  • Search: https://packagist.org/search/?q=<target>.
  • Per-package metadata: https://packagist.org/packages/<vendor>/<package>.json.

44.6 NuGet (.NET)

  • Search: https://www.nuget.org/packages?q=<target>.

44.7 Maven Central (Java)

  • Search: https://search.maven.org/?q=<target>.

44.8 Docker Hub / Quay / GHCR / ECR Public

Already covered in §16.18; worth noting for completeness as part of registry-sweep workflow.

44.9 Workflow

For each registry, for each candidate package owned-by-target:

  1. List all historical versions (often <package>@1.0.0 was clean but <package>@0.9.0 had a leaked key).
  2. Download each version's archive.
  3. Extract; run secret catalog (§17) over all files.
  4. Note .env, package.json/setup.py/Cargo.toml for hardcoded values.
  5. For Docker images: scan each layer (use dive or skopeo + docker save + extract layers).

44.10 Typosquat surveillance

For every published package the target owns, generate typosquat candidates (similar names, common substitutions) and check whether they're already taken by attackers (supply-chain attack surface).

# Example: target package "acme-utils"
# Candidates: acme-util, acmeutils, acme_utils, acme.utils, ac-me-utils, etc.
for candidate in acme-util acmeutils acme_utils acme.utils ac-me-utils; do
  npm view  2>&1 | head -3
done

If a candidate is registered to a non-target party → MEDIUM finding (typosquat, possible supply-chain attack vector).

45. Sat Imagery for Physical Recon

For engagements that include a physical-touch component (badge access, tailgating, dumpster diving, on-site network), public imagery helps scout the target.

45.1 Sat imagery sources

Source URL Notes
Google Earth Pro desktop app Historical timeline; high resolution (sub-meter) for major cities.
Google Maps maps.google.com Current; satellite layer; street view inside building lobbies sometimes.
Bing Maps Bird's Eye bing.com/maps Oblique/45-degree imagery for many regions; sometimes shows building facades better than top-down.
Apple Maps Look Around (iOS / Mac) Street-level; 3D in major cities.
Yandex Maps Panorama yandex.com/maps Russia + global; sometimes higher-resolution street-level than Google.
NearMap (paid) nearmap.com Highest-resolution commercial; updated frequently in served regions (US/AU/NZ/CA mostly).
Maxar / Planet Labs (paid) maxar.com / planet.com Tasking + recent imagery.
Sentinel Hub EO Browser apps.sentinel-hub.com Free Sentinel-2 (10m); good for change detection.
NASA Worldview worldview.earthdata.nasa.gov Free; multiple sensors.
Wayback ArcGIS livingatlas.arcgis.com/wayback/ Historical satellite.
OpenStreetMap openstreetmap.org Crowd-sourced map data with building outlines.

45.2 What to extract for physical recon

  • Building entrance count + locations — main entrance, employee entrances, loading docks, fire exits.
  • Parking lot ingress / egress — single guarded entry vs open lot.
  • Fence lines + camera locations — physical perimeter.
  • HVAC / utility access — roof access, service entries.
  • Adjacent occupants — neighboring tenants in same building / business park.
  • Vehicle types in lot — proxy for executive presence + employee count.
  • Smoking area locations — common social-engineering staging area.

45.3 OSINT-derived physical intel beyond satellites

  • LinkedIn employee photos — badge templates often visible in profile photos taken at the office.
  • Glassdoor "office tour" photos — employees post interior photos.
  • Indeed / Glassdoor reviews — sometimes describe security culture ("loose badge enforcement", "tailgating common").
  • Instagram geotagged photos — at the office address; reveals interior layout, badge designs, kitchen / common-area locations.
  • Public press releases — often contain "ribbon cutting" photos of new offices showing layout + executive faces.
  • Conference talks by IT/security staff — sometimes describe physical security setup.
  • Meetup / workshop event listings — at the target's office; may include photos.

45.4 Vehicle / fleet intel

  • License plates in LinkedIn/Instagram backgrounds — sometimes correlates to specific exec.
  • Company-branded vehicles in sat imagery — fleet count + location.
  • Helicopter pad / executive parking — clue to senior-leadership routine.

45.5 Discipline

  • Document that imagery + photos are public-source.
  • Don't trespass for "verification" — physical recon during OSINT phase = look only.
  • Note imagery date — buildings change.

46. Tooling Quick-Install

One-liner installs for the most-used external recon tools. All assume Linux/Mac with go/python/git installed.

46.1 Subdomain enumeration

# Subfinder (passive, fast)
go install github.com/projectdiscovery/subfinder/v2/cmd/subfinder@latest

# Amass (thorough, slow)
go install github.com/owasp-amass/amass/v4/...@master

# Assetfinder
go install github.com/tomnomnom/assetfinder@latest

# DNSx (resolution + brute)
go install github.com/projectdiscovery/dnsx/cmd/dnsx@latest

# Puredns (brute-force with wildcard handling)
go install github.com/d3mondev/puredns/v2@latest

46.2 HTTP probing & enrichment

# httpx (tech-detect, status, JARM, favicon)
go install github.com/projectdiscovery/httpx/cmd/httpx@latest

# Gowitness (screenshots)
go install github.com/sensepost/gowitness@latest

# Aquatone (screenshots + clustering)
go install github.com/michenriksen/aquatone@latest

46.3 Vulnerability scanning

# Nuclei (template scanner)
go install github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/v3/cmd/nuclei@latest
nuclei -ut    # update templates

# Naabu (port scan)
go install github.com/projectdiscovery/naabu/v2/cmd/naabu@latest

# Masscan (fast port scan; requires sudo)
git clone https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/masscan && cd masscan && make

46.4 Content discovery

# Ffuf (fuzzer / dirbuster)
go install github.com/ffuf/ffuf/v2@latest

# Gobuster
go install github.com/OJ/gobuster/v3@latest

# Feroxbuster (recursive content disco)
cargo install feroxbuster

46.5 JS / endpoint extraction

# Katana (crawler)
go install github.com/projectdiscovery/katana/cmd/katana@latest

# GoSpider
go install github.com/jaeles-project/gospider@latest

# LinkFinder (JS endpoint regex)
git clone https://github.com/GerbenJavado/LinkFinder && cd LinkFinder && pip install -r requirements.txt

# Subjs (extract JS URLs from HTML)
go install github.com/lc/subjs@latest

46.6 Wayback / archive

# gau (get all urls from Wayback + others)
go install github.com/lc/gau/v2/cmd/gau@latest

# Waybackurls
go install github.com/tomnomnom/waybackurls@latest

46.7 Cloud / AWS

# AWS CLI
pip install awscli
# or: brew install awscli

# Cloud_enum (S3/Azure/GCP enum)
git clone https://github.com/initstring/cloud_enum && cd cloud_enum && pip install -r requirements.txt

# S3Scanner
pip install s3scanner

# CloudSploit
git clone https://github.com/aquasecurity/cloudsploit && cd cloudsploit && npm install

46.8 Identity / SSO

# o365creeper / o365enum
git clone https://github.com/gremwell/o365enum

# CredMaster (per-protocol auth probe)
git clone https://github.com/knavesec/CredMaster

46.9 Mobile

# google-play-scraper (Python)
pip install google-play-scraper

# androguard (APK static analysis)
pip install androguard
# or: brew install androguard

# apkleaks (secret scan in APK)
pip install apkleaks

46.10 TLS / cert

# sslyze
pip install sslyze

# testssl.sh
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh.git

# JARM
pip install pyjarm

# Cert-spotter / certgraph
go install github.com/lanrat/certgraph@latest

46.11 Misc utilities

# Anew (line-dedup that streams)
go install github.com/tomnomnom/anew@latest

# Gf (regex-based grep templates)
go install github.com/tomnomnom/gf@latest

# Hakrawler (web crawler)
go install github.com/hakluke/hakrawler@latest

# Trufflehog (secret scanner)
go install github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog@latest

# Gitleaks
go install github.com/zricethezav/gitleaks/v8@latest

# jq (JSON parsing)
sudo apt install jq    # or brew install jq

46.12 Frameworks / orchestration

# ProjectDiscovery's "PDTM" (manages the full PD toolkit)
go install -v github.com/projectdiscovery/pdtm/cmd/pdtm@latest
pdtm -install-all

# reconftw (scripted recon framework)
git clone https://github.com/six2dez/reconftw && cd reconftw && ./install.sh

# Axiom (distributed recon on cloud nodes)
git clone https://github.com/pry0cc/axiom && cd axiom && ./interact/axiom-configure

47. Sector-Specific Recon Notes

Most recon generalizes; some sectors have unique attack-surface elements worth flagging.

47.1 Healthcare

  • DICOM (medical imaging) — port 11112, sometimes 4242 (testing).
  • HL7 v2 (clinical messaging) — port 2575 (TCP, often plaintext).
  • HL7 FHIR (modern REST API) — typically /fhir/R4/<resource> paths; OAuth / SMART-on-FHIR auth posture varies wildly.
  • PACS / RIS / EHR systems — Epic (*.epic.com SaaS), Cerner/Oracle Health, Allscripts/Veradigm, Athenahealth, NextGen, Meditech, eClinicalWorks. Each has known CVE history.
  • Searches: site:{domain} ("EHR" OR "PACS" OR "PHI" OR "HIPAA"), intitle:"Epic Systems" "{target}".
  • Severity escalation: any PHI exposure → CRITICAL (regulatory + reputational); HL7/DICOM open without auth → CRITICAL.

47.2 Finance

  • SWIFT terminals — typically internal-only; if external-facing, CRITICAL. Look for SWIFT Alliance Web Platform.
  • FIX protocol (electronic trading) — port 9876 (common); cleartext.
  • Bloomberg terminals — typically VDI; check for bloomberg.com-related auth surfaces.
  • Trading platform vendors — Fidessa, Charles River, Eze Software, Aladdin (BlackRock).
  • Banking middleware — Temenos T24, Finacle (Infosys), FIS, Jack Henry, Fiserv. Each has known CVE history.
  • Searches: site:{domain} ("PCI" OR "SOX" OR "GLBA" OR "MAS"), intitle:"Temenos" "{target}".
  • Severity escalation: any account/balance data exposure → CRITICAL; SWIFT exposure → CRITICAL; trade-execution surface exposure → CRITICAL.

47.3 ICS / SCADA / OT

Caution: ICS/SCADA assets often run on legacy systems where even passive scanning can cause disruption. Do not actively probe ICS without explicit RoE coverage and operator coordination with the OT team.

  • Modbus — port 502 (TCP).
  • BACnet — port 47808 (UDP).
  • Siemens S7 — port 102 (ISO-TSAP).
  • DNP3 — port 20000 (TCP).
  • EtherNet/IP — port 44818 (TCP).
  • Niagara Framework — port 1911, 4911, 5011, 502.
  • Honeywell EBI / Tridium — varies.
  • GE Proficy / iFIX — varies.
  • Common findings: unauthenticated read access (BACnet point list, Modbus register read), default credentials on HMI panels, public-facing engineering workstations.
  • Sources: Shodan ICS-specific filters (port:502, tag:ics), Censys, Onyphe.
  • Detectability: medium-to-high; ICS networks often have low background traffic and are heavily monitored.

47.4 IoT / Consumer / SOHO

  • MQTT — port 1883 (cleartext), 8883 (TLS). Topics often readable without auth.
  • CoAP — port 5683 (UDP).
  • UPnP / SSDP — port 1900 (UDP); often discloses internal device map.
  • Common router admin patterns: /cgi-bin/, /setup.cgi, /admin/index.html. Default creds are the norm.
  • Camera DVRs / NVRs — Hikvision, Dahua, Axis. Multiple CVEs.
  • Smart-home hubs — exposed APIs sometimes leak auth tokens.

47.5 Government

  • .gov and .mil domains require special engagement-scope discipline.
  • FedRAMP / FISMA / DoD CMMC — defensive posture is generally above baseline.
  • OSINT data sources: USAspending.gov, SAM.gov (System for Award Management), FBO.gov / sam.gov (procurement).
  • Common findings: vendor of record disclosed in public contracts → adjacent-vendor pivot.
  • Severity: as high or higher than commercial; political sensitivity layered on top of technical impact.

47.6 Maritime / Aviation / Auto

  • Maritime: AIS (Automatic Identification System) — vessel positions; tools MarineTraffic, VesselFinder. Engine telemetry sometimes exposed via VSAT.
  • Aviation: ADS-B (already covered §32.3); operator/airline-specific OPS data sometimes exposed.
  • Automotive: OEM telematics backends (Tesla, GM OnStar, etc.) — typically authenticated, but APIs leak via mobile-app reverse engineering.

47.7 Universal sector caveat

Most external recon techniques apply universally. Sector-specific protocols add attack surface; sector-specific compliance regimes add reporting requirements. Don't assume "healthcare/finance/etc. has different OSINT" — the OSINT is the same; the targeted services differ.

48. Runnable Helper — secret_scan.py

Drop-in Python helper that mirrors the 29-pattern catalog from §17. Pure stdlib, no dependencies. For operator use against captured text.

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Stdlib-only secret scanner. Mirrors the 29-pattern catalog.

Usage:
  echo "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE" | python3 secret_scan.py
  python3 secret_scan.py file1.txt file2.js dir/

Output: one JSON object per line: {pattern, severity, category, match, file, line}
"""
import json
import os
import re
import sys

SEV_CRITICAL = "critical"
SEV_HIGH = "high"
SEV_MEDIUM = "medium"
SEV_LOW = "low"

PATTERNS = [
    ("AWS_ACCESS_KEY",       SEV_CRITICAL, "aws",         r"\b(AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b"),
    ("AWS_SECRET_TYPED",     SEV_CRITICAL, "aws",         r"(?i)aws[_\-]?secret[_\-]?access[_\-]?key['\"\s:=]+([A-Za-z0-9/+=]{40})"),
    ("AWS_SECRET_LOOSE",     SEV_HIGH,     "aws",         r"(?i)aws(.{0,20})?(secret|sk)[\"'=: ]+([0-9a-z/+=]{40})"),
    ("GCP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT",  SEV_CRITICAL, "gcp",         r'"type"\s*:\s*"service_account"'),
    ("GOOGLE_API_KEY",       SEV_HIGH,     "gcp",         r"\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_\-]{35}\b"),
    ("GH_PAT_CLASSIC",       SEV_CRITICAL, "github",      r"\bghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b"),
    ("GH_PAT_FINEGRAINED",   SEV_CRITICAL, "github",      r"\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{82}\b"),
    ("GH_OAUTH",             SEV_HIGH,     "github",      r"\bgho_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b"),
    ("GH_S2S",               SEV_HIGH,     "github",      r"\bgh[usr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}\b"),
    ("STRIPE_LIVE",          SEV_CRITICAL, "stripe",      r"\bsk_live_[0-9A-Za-z]{24,}\b"),
    ("STRIPE_TEST",          SEV_LOW,      "stripe",      r"\bsk_test_[0-9A-Za-z]{24,}\b"),
    ("SLACK_TOKEN",          SEV_HIGH,     "slack",       r"\bxox[abpors]-[0-9A-Za-z\-]{10,48}\b"),
    ("SLACK_WEBHOOK",        SEV_MEDIUM,   "slack",       r"https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/T[A-Z0-9]+/B[A-Z0-9]+/[A-Za-z0-9]+"),
    ("SENDGRID",             SEV_HIGH,     "email_svc",   r"\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{22}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{43}\b"),
    ("MAILGUN_V1",           SEV_HIGH,     "email_svc",   r"\bkey-[0-9a-zA-Z]{32}\b"),
    ("MAILGUN_LOOSE",        SEV_HIGH,     "email_svc",   r"\bkey-[0-9a-f]{32}\b"),
    ("TWILIO_API",           SEV_HIGH,     "twilio",      r"\bSK[0-9a-fA-F]{32}\b"),
    ("TWILIO_SID",           SEV_MEDIUM,   "twilio",      r"\bAC[a-f0-9]{32}\b"),
    ("TWILIO_AUTH",          SEV_HIGH,     "twilio",      r"(?i)twilio(.{0,20})?(auth|token)[\"'=: ]+([a-f0-9]{32})"),
    ("HEROKU_API",           SEV_MEDIUM,   "paas",        r"(?i)heroku(.{0,20})?api[\"'=: ]+([0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12})"),
    ("FIREBASE_URL",         SEV_LOW,      "firebase",    r"\bhttps?://[a-z0-9\-]+\.firebaseio\.com\b"),
    ("JWT",                  SEV_MEDIUM,   "jwt",         r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}\b"),
    ("BEARER_AUTH",          SEV_MEDIUM,   "bearer",      r"(?i)authorization[\"'=: ]+bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._\-]{20,}"),
    ("BASIC_AUTH_URL",       SEV_MEDIUM,   "basic_auth",  r"https?://[^/\s:@]+:[^/\s:@]+@[^/\s]+"),
    ("RSA_PRIVKEY",          SEV_CRITICAL, "private_key", r"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"),
    ("EC_PRIVKEY",           SEV_CRITICAL, "private_key", r"-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----"),
    ("OPENSSH_PRIVKEY",      SEV_CRITICAL, "private_key", r"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----"),
    ("GENERIC_PRIVKEY",      SEV_CRITICAL, "private_key", r"-----BEGIN (DSA |PGP |)PRIVATE KEY-----"),
    ("GENERIC_API_KEY",      SEV_MEDIUM,   "generic",     r"(?i)(?:api[_\-]?key|apikey|api_secret|access_token|secret[_\-]?token)['\"\s:=]+[\"']([A-Za-z0-9+/=_\-]{24,})[\"']"),
]

COMPILED = [(n, s, c, re.compile(p)) for (n, s, c, p) in PATTERNS]

def scan_text(text: str, source: str = "<stdin>"):
    for line_no, line in enumerate(text.splitlines(), start=1):
        for name, sev, cat, rx in COMPILED:
            for m in rx.finditer(line):
                yield {
                    "pattern": name,
                    "severity": sev,
                    "category": cat,
                    "match": m.group(0)[:80],   # truncate to avoid huge dumps
                    "source": source,
                    "line": line_no,
                }

def scan_path(path: str):
    if os.path.isdir(path):
        for root, _, files in os.walk(path):
            for f in files:
                p = os.path.join(root, f)
                yield from scan_path(p)
        return
    try:
        with open(path, "r", errors="replace") as fh:
            yield from scan_text(fh.read(), source=path)
    except Exception:
        return

def main():
    if len(sys.argv) > 1:
        for arg in sys.argv[1:]:
            for hit in scan_path(arg):
                print(json.dumps(hit))
    else:
        data = sys.stdin.read()
        for hit in scan_text(data):
            print(json.dumps(hit))

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Save as secret_scan.py, then:

python3 secret_scan.py path/to/repo/        # scan a directory tree
python3 secret_scan.py file1 file2 file3    # scan specific files
cat my.log | python3 secret_scan.py         # pipe stdin

Output is JSONL — one finding per line — drops cleanly into jq for filtering or directly into a finding store.

49. Skill Self-Test

Drop these prompts into a fresh Claude session to verify the skill loads correctly.

  1. "What paths should I probe to find Swagger or OpenAPI specs on a webapp?" → §16.1.
  2. "Give me the GraphQL introspection query I should POST." → §16.2.
  3. "What are the high-risk ports to flag from a Shodan scan?" → §16.3.
  4. "Show me the secret regex catalog." → §17 (48 patterns) + §48 (runnable Python).
  5. "How do I score an API endpoint by attack interest?" → §20.
  6. "Validate a leaked Postman API key — what URL?" → §23.1.
  7. "Give me dorks for pastebin/gist/ghostbin leaks for a target." → §18.3.
  8. "What endpoints fingerprint a Microsoft Entra tenant?" → §22.1 + §22.8 for M365 deep.
  9. "How do I score whether a discovered Android app belongs to my target?" → §21.
  10. "What attack-path hint when I find unauth POST on /api/users?" → §39 (first row).
  11. "Curl one-liner to test for /actuator/env." → §16.13.
  12. "Show me the GraphQL field-suggestion enumeration trick when introspection is disabled." → §22.9.
  13. "Found a hard-coded JWT in JS. Walk me through full triage." → §23.12 (JWT workflow).
  14. "Generate cloud bucket candidates for Target with subdomains api/billing/hr." → §16.8.
  15. "How do I find Microsoft 365 Teams federation status + SharePoint subdomains?" → §22.8.
  16. "Probe paths for Citrix Netscaler / F5 BIG-IP / Pulse Secure." → §16.16.
  17. "Find the origin behind Cloudflare on target.example." → §16.15 + companion methodology §27.
  18. "What ports/paths probe for Kubernetes/etcd/kubelet exposure?" → §16.18.
  19. "Audit acme.com's SPF/DMARC for spoof feasibility." → §16.14.
  20. "List wordlist sources for subdomain bruteforce + content discovery." → §27.1.
  21. "Run reverse-DNS sweep across a /22 the target owns." → §28.5.
  22. "Validate an OpenAI API key without burning quota." → §23.6 + §23.12.
  23. "Find leaked secrets across npm/PyPI/Docker Hub for the target." → §44.
  24. "How do I enumerate target employees on LinkedIn for a phishing list?" → §41.
  25. "What's a Slack invite link enumeration technique?" → §43.1.
  26. "What's the EPSS score and KEV status for CVE-2024-3400?" → §29.2.
  27. "What modern AI API keys (Anthropic / OpenAI / HuggingFace / Cloudflare) match catalog patterns?" → §17 rows 30–48.
  28. "Severity matrix for android:debuggable=true on prod app?" → §40.
  29. "Install commands for the standard recon toolkit (subfinder/httpx/nuclei/etc.)?" → §46.
  30. "For a healthcare engagement, what additional ports / protocols matter?" → §47.1.
  31. "Pull HudsonRock breach corpus for target.com via direct API (no UI)." → §15.0.1.
  32. "Run the full §16.14 email security audit from a Windows box (PowerShell)." → §16.14 PowerShell parallel.
  33. "crt.sh just 502'd. What's the fallback chain?" → §27.0.1.
  34. "Bulk IP → ASN lookup for 200 IPs without burning bgpview rate limit." → §28.1 (Cymru bulk).
  35. "Common-prefix subdomain sweep for target.example covering vpn / api / staging / portal / intranet." → §16.24.
  36. "Legacy mail (mail.<domain>) is NXDOMAIN today but breach corpus has employee URLs against it. What's the finding?" → §15.2 legacy-mail-decommissioned pattern.
  37. "Confirm M365 tenancy when MX is wrapped by Mimecast (so MX doesn't reveal underlying mail platform)." → §22.1 autodiscover IP correlation + §16.22 autodiscover-as-confirmation.
  38. "DMARC RUA points to kdmarc.com — what does that tell me?" → §16.14 DMARC reporting-vendor table.
  39. "SharePoint HEAD probe returns HTTP 200. Does that mean anonymous access is granted?" → §22.8 (no — tenant exists, not anonymous access; distinguish).
  40. "Wayback *.js query returned empty for a brochure-ware site. Pivot?" → §16.23 legacy-app pivot (.asp / .php / .jsp / .cfm / .aspx).

50. Changelog

  • v2.1.1 (2026-04-27) — battle-test gap fixes from real-engagement smoke run. Added: §15.0.1 HudsonRock Cavalier direct-API recipe (curl + PowerShell, full JSON shape, free-tier redaction caveats, rate-limit guidance). §15.2 expanded with legacy-mail-decommissioned escalation pattern (NXDOMAIN legacy mail + breach corpus + autodiscover-confirmed cloud migration → CRITICAL SSO_EXPOSURE). §16.14 expanded with DMARC reporting-vendor table (Kratikal kdmarc / dmarcian / Valimail / Agari / EasyDMARC / DMARC Analyzer / Postmark) + full Windows/PowerShell parallel for the entire email security audit + caveat that PS 5.1 Resolve-DnsName -Type CAA errors (use PS 7+ or nslookup -type=CAA). §16.22 expanded TXT verification token catalog with 17 new tokens (zscaler-verification, cloudflare-verify, autosect, cisco-site-verification, mscid, _amazonses, salesforce-domain-verification, workday/shopify/klaviyo/mailchimp/hubspot/zendesk/freshworks/intercom/loom/miro/gitlab) + new "Autodiscover-as-confirmation" pattern for M365 detection when MX is wrapped by Mimecast/Proofpoint/Barracuda. §22.1 added passive Autodiscover IP correlation pattern with Microsoft Exchange Online IP ranges. §22.8 added clarification: SharePoint HEAD HTTP 200 = tenant exists, NOT anonymous access granted (operators commonly misread). New §16.23 legacy-app pivot block (when Wayback *.js returns empty for brochure-ware sites, pivot to .asp/.php/.jsp/.cfm/.aspx/.json/.xml/.yml/.ini/.conf — with full broad-sweep one-liner). New §16.24 Common-Prefix Subdomain Sweep — formalized active prefix-probe technique with 100+ ordered prefix list, PowerShell + bash + puredns recipes, and real-engagement validation note (passive enum misses 20-40% of high-value subdomains; always pair with active prefix probe). §27.0.1 added crt.sh fallback chain (Censys, CertSpotter, Calidog, Subfinder, OTX, ThreatMiner, URLScan, Anubis-DB) with PowerShell wrapper that retries crt.sh 3× then falls back to Subfinder. §28.1 added Bulk IP→ASN recipes (Cymru bulk WHOIS, RIPEstat, bgp.tools, IPinfo Lite) + caveat that bgpview.io API has aggressive rate limits unsuitable for bulk. §40 severity matrix gained 8 rows: vendor procurement portal exposed + breach corpus hits (HIGH), PII-collection portal over plain HTTP (HIGH), decommissioned legacy mail + breach + cloud migration (CRITICAL), public-facing intranet without VPN (MEDIUM), staging/preprod publicly resolvable (MEDIUM), vpn. resolves but vendor unknown (INFO escalating to HIGH-CRITICAL on KEV match), DMARC RUA → third-party vendor (INFO). §49 self-test expanded from 30 → 40 prompts targeting all new content.
  • v2.1 (2026-04-27) — comprehensive expansion based on 32-test smoke-test gap analysis. Added: copy-paste curl probes for every check (§16.13), email security analysis with SPF/DMARC/DKIM/BIMI/MTA-STS/DNSSEC parsing + SaaS tenant inference (§16.14), origin discovery / CDN bypass via DNS history + cert SAN + favicon hash + JARM + Host-header probe (§16.15), vendor product fingerprints for Citrix/F5/Pulse/Fortinet/PaloAlto/Cisco/VMware/Exchange + KEV CVE associations (§16.16), cloud-native service URL fingerprints — Lambda Function URLs, Cloud Run, Cloud Functions, Azure Functions, Vercel, Netlify, Cloudflare Workers, etc. (§16.17), container & Kubernetes exposure (kubelet, etcd, K8s API, dashboard, Helm Tiller, container registries) (§16.18), CI/CD platform exposure (Jenkins deeper, GitLab, GitHub Actions, CircleCI, TeamCity, Argo CD, Spinnaker) (§16.19), documentation/wiki leak paths (Notion, Confluence, Trello, Miro, Lucidchart, Figma, ReadTheDocs, GitBook, Slab, Coda, etc.) (§16.20), WHOIS/RDAP/historical-WHOIS recipes + reverse-WHOIS pivots (§16.21), DNS record catalog with TXT verification token table → SaaS tenant inference (§16.22), Wayback CDX deep usage with all filter parameters (§16.23). Expanded: §17 secret catalog from 29 → 48 patterns adding modern AI API keys (Anthropic, OpenAI legacy + project, HuggingFace), infra (Cloudflare, DigitalOcean), package registries (npm, PyPI, Docker Hub), SaaS (Atlassian, Linear), observability (New Relic, DataDog, Sentry DSN), bot tokens (Discord, Telegram), and ngrok. Expanded §18 dork corpus from 50+ → 80+ with internal-tool exposure (Splunk/Grafana/Kibana/Argo CD/Sonarqube/Confluence/Jira/GitLab/Gitea), backup-file extensions, and sector-specific dorks (healthcare/finance/gov). Added §22.8 Microsoft 365 deep enumeration (Teams federation, SharePoint subdomain probe, OneDrive personal-site probe, OAuth client_id discovery, device-code phishing target check, Power Platform). Added §22.9 GraphQL field-suggestion enumeration recipe + alias batching, query-depth bypass, subscription enumeration, batched-query bypass. Added §23.5–23.9 read-only validators for Anthropic, OpenAI, npm, Atlassian, DataDog (5 new). Added §23.12 post-discovery enumeration workflows (AWS IAM enum, GitHub PAT scope/repo enum, Slack workspace enum, JWT full triage with algorithm-confusion + brute-force + none-bypass, Postman PMAK workspace enum, Anthropic + OpenAI usage enum, generic key provenance enum). Pinned §24 Postman search endpoint with verified shape + DevTools fallback recipe. Added §27.1 wordlist sources (Assetnote, SecLists, jhaddix, OneListForAll, raft-large-words, fuzzdb, etc.) + size guidance. Added §28.4 TLS deep audit (sslyze + testssl.sh + nmap + JA3/JA4 + cipher/protocol/cert checks). Added §28.5 reverse DNS sweep + IPv6 enumeration + BGP route observation. Added §29.2 vulnerability prioritization data sources (NVD/EPSS/CISA KEV/ExploitDB/Metasploit/InTheWild/OpenCVE/Trickest CVE+POC mapping/OSV.dev/VulnCheck KEV) + bulk prioritization workflow. Expanded §39 attack-path hints with 15 more templates (open kubelet/etcd, K8s API anonymous, Citrix/F5/vCenter/Cloud Function unauth, npm typosquat, DMARC missing, live AI keys, Slack invite, sourcemap with sourcesContent). Expanded §40 severity matrix with 30 more worked examples covering Kubernetes/container, vendor products with KEV CVEs, M365/cloud-native, CI/CD misconfig, documentation leaks, email-security gaps, AI/package-registry credentials, TLS issues. Added §41 LinkedIn employee enumeration tradecraft (search techniques + role inference + email-pattern derivation + sock-puppet considerations). Added §42 job posting tech-stack analysis (sources + extraction + tooling). Added §43 Slack/Discord/Telegram/Mattermost workspace discovery. Added §44 package registry leak hunting (npm/PyPI/RubyGems/Cargo/Packagist/NuGet/Maven Central + workflow + typosquat surveillance). Added §45 sat imagery for physical recon (sources + extraction + LinkedIn/Glassdoor/Instagram/conference intel + vehicle/fleet intel). Added §46 tooling quick-install (subdomain, HTTP probing, vuln scanning, content discovery, JS extraction, Wayback, cloud, identity, mobile, TLS, utilities, frameworks). Added §47 sector-specific recon notes (healthcare DICOM/HL7/FHIR/EHR + finance SWIFT/FIX/Bloomberg/banking middleware + ICS-SCADA Modbus/BACnet/S7/DNP3 + IoT MQTT/CoAP/UPnP + government FedRAMP/FISMA + maritime/aviation/auto). Renumbered Runnable Helper → §48, Self-Test → §49 (refreshed for v2.1), Changelog → §50.
  • v2.0 (2026-04-27) — major rewrite for external red-team posture. Added: pre-built wordlists (§16), 29-pattern secret catalog (§17), 50+ dork corpus (§18), GitHub code-search dorks (§19), endpoint interest score (§20), mobile ownership confidence (§21), identity-fabric concrete endpoints (§22), read-only secret validators (§23), Postman workspace search (§24), Stack Exchange sweep (§25), public SaaS dorks (§26), subdomain-source stack (§27), domain-level breach severity (§15.1), L2 explorer table (§30.2), USCC + ICP workflow (§14.2), cross-module sidecar coordination (§36), attack-path hint patterns (§39), severity decision matrix (§40), runnable secret-scan helper (§41). Strengthened: confidence levels (§2), output format (§3), do-not rules (§5). Original tool tables retained and lightly reorganized.
  • v1.x — original tool-reference cheat sheet.